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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The corporate failures in the US, such as Enron
and WorldCom, and more recently the Parmalat
scandal in Italy, have considerably damaged
investors’ confidence in the functioning of
financial markets and the ability of the
regulatory framework to safeguard their
interests and prevent fraud. Although the
number of corporate scandals in Europe has so
far been smaller than in the US, and their impact
relatively more contained, European investor
confidence has nonetheless also been dented.
Furthermore, as in the US, alleged serious,
irregular accounting practices short of fraud
have come to light (e.g. in the case of Ahold, the
Dutch retailer).
On a general level, these episodes demonstrate
that market failures exist, which can undermine
the effectiveness of market discipline to ensure
the appropriate allocation of capital. A key
issue raised by the recent wave of corporate
scandals is whether in the late 1990s conditions
existed that made financial markets more prone
to support corporate “excesses”1 and abrupt
adjustments. Furthermore, although fewer
episodes of corporate malfeasance have come to
light in Europe, financial markets have at times
showed more pronounced swings in prices than
in the US over recent years. This suggests the
need to analyse how institutional features in
Europe and in the US might have affected
financial market outcomes, and to assess what
policy responses may be appropriate in order to
correct possible market failures.
This paper deliberately adopts a very
‘microstructure’ view of financial markets,
namely by concentrating on those features that
affect the processes by which investors’ latent
demands are ultimately translated into
transactions, and in particular examining what
frictions may exist that impede the efficient
operation of financial markets. In doing so, it
necessarily ignores a number of important
influences on financial market outcomes, such
as the macroeconomic environment, structural
changes in the institutional set-up (e.g. the
introduction of the single European currency),
geopolitical uncertainties, market liquidity
effects, and so on.
Specifically, the paper considers four particular
features of financial markets that may have
given rise to market failures: (a) perverse
incentives/conflicts of interest; (b) destabilising
trading/investment strategies; (c) lack of
disclosure/transparency; and (d) concentrated
versus fragmented ownership structures. The
paper reviews the theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence related to these four possible
types of market failure, illustrating this with
evidence drawn from the most recent corporate
scandals.
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
about the underlying forces driving market
outcomes. Articulating the link between
financial market dynamics and market failures
is not easy – attempting to map developments in
largely unobservable variables (payoffs,
incentives, strategies, information sets etc. of
investors) into changes in “observables”, such
as financial market prices and quantities, is
fraught with difficulties. Moreover, any
empirical analysis is unlikely to be able to
control for all the possible relevant factors so as
to isolate the influence of the issue at hand. In
particular, unrealistic expectations about future
economic performance and the risk attached to
investments, as well as the sustained period of
macroeconomic stability, were undoubtedly
major factors in fuelling the asset price bubble
of the late 1990s. Nonetheless, the evidence
presented raises the possibility that conflicts of
interest and the inadequacy of information
disclosure may also have contributed to recent
swings in financial markets in Europe as well as
in the United States.
The evidence is not unequivocal. However, it is
possible that the financial market bubble was, at
least in part, inflated by biased investment
1 Situations in which company managers pursue particular
strategies that lead to excessive risk-taking relative to the
underlying preferences of the (ultimate) owners of the firm.5
ECB




advice given by stock market analysts and
broker-dealers. Although the more innocent
explanation of “irrational exuberance” on the
part of such analysts cannot be ruled out, their
history of biased earnings forecasts is perhaps
more consistent with the influence of the
conflicts of interest embedded in combining
investment advice with securities underwriting
and brokerage activities.
These kinds of conflicts of interest are as likely
to occur in Europe as in the US – and the
ongoing investigations into the role of financial
institutions in advising Parmalat serve to
reinforce this point. So the effect of conflicts of
interest alone seems unlikely to account for the
greater volatility in European financial markets
over recent years. However, a second feature,
the limited disclosure and lack of transparency
in financial accounts,  may arguably have
played a larger role in Europe. European firms
score relatively low in terms of the transparency
of the financial information they make available
on a number of measures. To the extent that
investors had access to inadequate accounting
information that impeded them from fully
understanding the nature of the risk exposures
taken on by firms, this could have contributed
to significant price misalignments during the
market upswing in the late 1990s. In similar
fashion, the revelation of corporate malpractice,
although less widespread in Europe to date,
could have triggered greater investor worries
given the relative opacity of accounting
information. That is, if investors fear that the
limited transparency of information in European
firms’ accounts may have covered up corporate
excesses, the reaction of financial markets
could be consistent with greater perceived
uncertainty about potential returns.
In contrast, there is perhaps less evidence that
destabilising trading or investment strategies
have had a particularly influential, or at least
long-lasting, effect on financial market
dynamics in recent years. On occasions, such
market frictions can lead to bouts of instability,
perhaps the most obvious recent example being
the stress tests of life insurance companies’
asset portfolios, which may have encouraged
equity sales despite unfavourable trading
conditions. However, it is difficult to believe
that such positive feedback trading can explain
the persistently high volatility in financial
markets over the past few years. To the extent
that trading innovations may have contributed
to instability in the past, for example in the
stock market crash of 1987 and the period of
bond market turbulence in autumn 1998, such
effects were largely temporary.2 Similarly,
misalignments in asset markets, which could
have been influenced by particular types of
institutional behaviour, have occurred, but have
typically been short-lived. That said, further
research in this area would be useful if the
impact of institutional incentive structures on
financial market dynamics is to be assessed
fully.3
Little evidence is available to suggest that the
ownership structure of firms has had a
systematic effect on market dynamics. In
theory, both the main forms of ownership
structure – the so-called shareholder and
stakeholder models – can create conditions
where the actions of firms may not be consistent
with the preferences of the majority of their
owners. However, the potential links with
financial market outcomes are not particularly
clear or conclusive in either stylised
framework.4 And this ambiguity is borne out in
empirical studies examining the relationship
between ownership concentration and firms’
performance, which have generally yielded
mixed results. Nevertheless, it is probably fair
2 Of course, to some extent this may have reflected policy
intervention. For example, the stock market crash of 1987
encouraged the NYSE to introduce “trade-breaker” rules for
equity market trading.
3 A recent BIS (2003) study on this issue, based on a
comprehensive review of the literature and extensive interviews
with market practitioners, was unable to reach a clear-cut
conclusion on the aggregate effect of particular institutional
features in the asset management industry on financial market
outcomes.
4 In the shareholder model, diffuse share ownership can lead to
collective action problems, which undermine the disciplining
mechanisms of shareholders. In the stakeholder model,
blockholders may coerce firms’ management into undertaking
policies that are not in the interests of minority shareholders but
confer private benefits onto themselves.6
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to say that the available empirical studies have
not adequately addressed the impact of
corporate governance arrangements on financial
market outcomes. This is especially true in
Europe, where a large number of firms are not
publicly listed. It would therefore be unwise to
rule out important links between ownership
structure and market dynamics, particularly
when there have been specific examples where
it appears to have been influential.5 Again, the
Parmalat case provides a timely reminder of this
point.
To some extent, market-led solutions to these
problems are likely to emerge. Financial
intermediaries rely to a large extent on their
reputations. Recent events, however, have
shaken investor trust in a number of established
intermediaries, which gives the latter an
incentive to adopt practices to restore this trust.
For example, investment banks are now more
likely to investigate ways of strengthening the
firewalls between departments, if only to
satisfy investor worries about conflicts of
interest, let alone avoid legal reprisals.
Similarly, rating agencies have already
implemented a number of procedures designed
to assure the independence and objectivity of
the rating process – e.g. requiring ratings
decisions to be made by ratings committees,
imposing investment restrictions, and adhering
to fixed fee schedules.
Nonetheless, policy-makers have also
responded with increased regulation. In the US,
most of the regulatory response is enshrined in
the Sarbanes-Oxley (S-O) Act. In Europe, a
number of regulatory changes were already in
the pipeline before the recent corporate scandals
as part of the Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP), with the aim of developing and
strengthening the single European market. The
recent spate of corporate scandals has given
greater impetus to this process, and has indeed
been influential in framing changes to the
proposed regulations.
The lack of transparency in financial account
reporting, and information disclosure more
generally, had previously been recognised as a
particular weakness in Europe, resulting in a
number of EU Directives that attempt to address
this issue. These directives should improve the
flow of information to investors, and in
particular facilitate comparability across firms
in Europe. They are therefore likely to enhance
the efficiency of financial markets and
strengthen market discipline.
As far as conflicts of interest are concerned, a
number of national regulators in Europe have
implemented rules or have undertaken
investigations into the conflicts of interest
facing investment analysts.6 So far at least, the
new rules in Europe are less severe than in the
US. To some extent, this reflects the fact that
global market participants may adopt US
practices as the de facto industry standard.
It could also reflect the smaller role of private
(i.e. non-professional) investors in Europe,
for whose protection regulation is often
rationalised. There are potential drawbacks
associated with separating functions that might
give rise to conflicts of interest such as
investment research and underwriting activities.
Information is costly to acquire and sometimes
cannot be revealed without giving specific
advantages to competitors, so the separation of
certain activities could ultimately have the
perverse effect of reducing the amount of
information available in financial markets. EU
regulators therefore need to monitor how far the
new rules are effective in curbing the most
profligate behaviour without unduly impeding
market efficiency, or to decide whether stronger
regulation is required.
One area where the official response has so far
been quite limited, both in the US and Europe,
5 Arguably the transparency of the structure of firm ownership
and organisation is also important. Transparency of structure
may help demonstrate to investors that conflicts of interest have
been appropriately addressed.
6 IOSCO set up a task force to examine conflicts of interest facing
sell-side security analysts and rating agencies. Similarly, at the
EU level, the European Securities Committee (ESC) has
established a Forum Group on Financial Analysts to make
recommendations on the best regulatory and market practices for
financial analysts.7
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is in relation to rating agencies, whose role in
financial markets has become increasingly more
influential. Rating agencies often face conflicts
of interest similar to those faced by investment
bank analysts, and could have been similarly
influential in inflating asset prices in the late
1990s. Moreover, the high degree of market
concentration – the three major US-based
agencies dominate the global market, although
quite a number of smaller rating agencies also
exist – raises questions about how effective
market discipline actually is. A number of
official reviews of the role of rating agencies
are currently underway – for example, by the
SEC7 – with a view to introducing measures
to foster competition and to promote
improvements in market practices. Progress on
this front will have to be monitored to ensure
that any proposals do not raise financial
stability concerns of their own (for example, a
move towards more “point-in-time” ratings
could encourage greater pro-cyclicality).
7 The US SEC issued a “concept” release that discusses, among
other issues, proposals for more public disclosure of information
about the key methods and assumptions underlying rating
decisions; how to avoid potential conflicts of interest; and how to
reduce potential regulatory barriers to entry.8
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INTRODUCTION
The recent highly publicised corporate failures
in the US, such as Enron and WorldCom and,
more recently, the Parmalat scandal in Italy,
have sparked widespread debate about the
operation of capital markets and the role of
certain market participants and financial
intermediaries. In particular, these episodes
have served as a timely reminder that market
failures exist even in deep and liquid capital
markets and that, in certain circumstances, these
can lead to serious resource misallocation.
So far there have been less corporate scandals
in Europe than in the US, and their impact has
been relatively more contained. Last year, The
Economist reported that in the US “as many as
1,200 companies have been forced to restate
their accounts in the past five years; in Europe
the number is barely in double digits.”8
Nonetheless, as well as Parmalat, there have
been other high profile European corporate
defaults and court cases of alleged irregular
accounting in recent years, for example the
Dutch company Ahold, the Swiss company
Adecco, and the Italian company Cirio. Indeed,
following Parmalat, the short-term impact of
more stringent oversight by public and private
bodies (e.g. auditors) may well be that more
evidence of corporate malpractice will come to
light.
Furthermore, particular strategies pursued by
some European companies have led to
significant weaknesses in corporate financial
health, if not outright default. For example, the
increased leverage built up by a number of
companies in the technology-media-
telecommunications (TMT) sector subsequently
made them particularly vulnerable when
expectations of future profit growth were
sharply revised downwards. A key issue is
whether these corporate “excesses”9 simply
reflect the natural fallibility of market forces –
in a world of uncertainty, there will always be
well-intentioned but ultimately ill-judged
business decisions – or whether particular
institutional features in financial markets
prevented the normal checks and balances from
effectively controlling firm and investor
behaviour. That is, whether conditions existed
that prevented market discipline from ensuring
(ex ante) the efficient flow of capital to the most
promising investment opportunities, so that (ex
post) the subsequent correction in financial
market imbalances has been sharper and more
pronounced.10
Charts 1-3 compare the performance of the euro
area and US stock markets over the past ten
years. Chart 1 clearly shows that the late 1990s
stock market “boom” occurred in both trading
areas, but was more pronounced in the euro area
markets – between January 1997 and March
2000, the Dow Jones Euro STOXX index rose
by more than 160%. Over the same period the
Standard & Poor’s 500 index increased by
around 100%. Thereafter both markets went on
a declining path until mid-March 2003, when
the euro area market fell more than the US.
Chart 2 plots historical volatility (measured by
the monthly average of daily price changes) for
the two markets. By this measure, equity
volatility increased notably both in the euro area
and in the US over the late 1990s. Chart 3 plots
implied volatility, computed from options on
the market index, for the two markets since
1998. Up to June 2002, the relative movements
in the two series are quite similar. However,
thereafter and until March 2003, the euro area
market experienced a significant increase in
implied volatility compared to its historical
average. The sharp decline in implied volatility
starting in the second quarter of 2003 brought
this measure of market participants’ uncertainty
down to historically low levels in both markets.
8 The Economist, 1 March 2003.
9 Situations in which company managers pursue particular
strategies that lead to excessive risk-taking relative to the
underlying preferences of the (ultimate) owners of the firm.
10 A particularly clear manifestation of this amplified volatility in
financial market outcomes is the notion of so-called fallen
angels. These are issuers that are downgraded from investment
grade (BBB- and above) to speculative grade (BB+ and below).
According to S&P, the number of “fallen angels” increased each
year from 1996 to 2002, when it peaked amidst widespread credit
deterioration combined with anxiety about corporate scandals
and accounting impropriety, before falling back in 2003.9
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 INTRODUCTION
Chart 1 Stock market price indices – US and
euro area
(index: Jan. 1993 = 100)





































Chart 3 Implied volatility of stock market
indices – the euro area and the US
(index: June 1998 = 100)
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.






























The growth in amounts outstanding of corporate
bonds in the euro area has fallen over the past two
years from the peaks reached at the end of 1999,
partly reflecting turbulence in the financial
markets and the high level of market uncertainty.
Nevertheless, net issuance has remained positive.
More generally, debt financing of euro area firms
(which also includes bank borrowing) grew very
rapidly in the late 1990s in the euro area, in fact at
a faster rate than for US firms in recent years
(Chart 4). Part of this build-up in debt could be
due to one-off balance adjustments caused by
Chart 2 Historical volatility of US and euro
area stock market price indices
(index: Jan. 1993 = 100)
Sources: Thomson Financial Datastream and authors’
calculations.
Note: Monthly average of daily volatility.




























Sources: ECB, Federal Reserve Board.
Note: There are issues of precise comparability between the two
series. The euro area corporate debt is calculated using annual
financial accounts, which are generally non-consolidated and
partially include inter-company loans, depending on the
availability of statistical sources. Moreover, euro area
corporate debt includes non-autonomous pension funds reserves
of non-financial corporations, which do not exist in the United
States (see also the article on “Developments in private sector
balance sheets in the euro area and the United States” in the
February 2004 issue of the ECB Monthly Bulletin). 
Chart 4 Annual growth in corporate debt in
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firms seeking to adjust their balance sheets in
anticipation of the introduction of the single
currency. In addition, firms might simply have
taken advantage of the environment of low
interest rates, which increased the level of
sustainable debt. To the extent that such
borrowing looked excessive relative to
expectations of future growth, this could be
consistent with the sharper equity market
correction in the euro area (compared with the
United States), as investors demanded higher
returns to compensate for the higher risk
associated with any debt overhang.
Is there any evidence that characteristic market
failures contributed to recent corporate
excesses and subsequent “bust”? How much of
the differential pattern in the euro area can be
attributed to peculiar market characteristics?
To address these questions the paper reviews
the theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence related to possible market failures,
using illustrations drawn from the most recent
spate of corporate scandals. The paper
deliberately adopts a very “microstructure”
view of financial markets. That is, it
concentrates on those features that affect the
processes by which investors’ latent demands
are ultimately translated into transactions, in
particular examining what frictions may exist
that impede the efficient operation of financial
markets. In doing so, it necessarily ignores a
number of important influences on financial
market outcomes, such as the macroeconomic
environment, structural changes in the
institutional set-up (e.g. the introduction of the
single European currency), geopolitical
uncertainties, market liquidity effects, and so
on. All of these factors could have played a
significant part in the evolution of financial
markets in recent years. The fact that they are
not discussed in this paper should not be taken
as an indication of their lack of importance, but
instead that the main focus of the paper lies on
other potentially significant features.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1
outlines the conceptual link between market
failures and financial market dynamics. This
forms a backdrop for a discussion of the
potential sources of market failure described in
Section 2. The section also investigates the
empirical evidence on how far these market
failures might account for any differences in the
European and US experience. Recent responses
by national regulators and policymakers are
summarised in Section 3. Finally, Section 4
offers some concluding remarks.11
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In perfect markets, prices continually reflect the
demand and supply schedules of all potential
investors. These equilibrium prices represent
the fundamental market valuations which
should prevail in the long run and which ensure
that resources are allocated efficiently across
competing uses.11 However, in practice,
markets are not perfect – market failures12 exist
which mean that, in the short term, transaction
prices may deviate from long-run equilibrium
values. More specifically, short-term deviations
may arise, for example because of frictions such
as transaction costs, asymmetric information as
well as strategic behaviour on the part of market
participants. As a result, the process by which
prices converge to (or indeed diverge further
from) equilibrium – i.e. market price dynamics
– will have implications for efficiency in
allocating funds in the economy. In particular,
discrepancies between price and fundamental
value affect the level and choice of corporate
financing, providing a potential link from the
microstructure of financial markets to the field
of corporate finance and in turn to the episodes
of corporate excess witnessed in recent years.
Articulating the precise relationship between
potential market failures and financial market
dynamics is not easy. This is because the
sources of market failures relate to institutional
features that are largely unobservable, such as
payoffs, incentive structures, strategies,
information sets, etc.. Attempting to map
developments in these variables to changes in
“observables” such as financial market prices
and volumes (and higher moments of these)
is therefore fraught with difficulties.
Nevertheless, a new branch of the economic
literature – so-called market microstructure
models – has developed in recent years that
considers these types of issues. Various models
have been formulated which investigate the
institutional structure of financial markets,
including information distribution patterns and
the resulting incentive structures faced by
market participants, with a view to
understanding better the asset price discovery
process. That is, their goal is to look inside the
“black box” by which latent demands are
1 MARKET FAILURES AND FINANCIAL MARKET
DYNAMICS
translated into realised prices and volumes. A
central tenet in microstructure is that asset
prices need not equal the full information
expectations of future values owing to a variety
of frictions (Madhavan, 2002).
To fix ideas, a key component of many market
microstructure models relates to incomplete or
imperfect information that is known by all or
certain market participants. In particular, the
extent of market transparency (i.e. the ability of
market participants to observe information
about the trading process) can impact
significantly on the behaviour of traders/
investors and their strategies. For example,
revelations about particular transactions by
certain market participants may be used by less
informed traders as a signal about future value
and thus lead them to revise their opinions.
Another line of enquiry in the microstructure
literature considers “market architecture”,
which defines the environment governing the
trading and investment process in financial
markets. Many academic studies have shown
that market structure matters, as it affects the
speed and quality of price discovery, liquidity
and cost of trading. Particular features of the
market that can affect asset price dynamics
include the extent of programme trading and
more general trading protocols, imperfect
competition, and the types of channels through
which information is disseminated.
The presence of market failures, or more
generally departures from the paradigm of
perfect competition, creates the potential for
government intervention. That is, there may be a
role for government policies to solve market
failures by increasing competition, improving
information and fixing incomplete markets. For
11 Formally, under the so-called First Welfare Theorem of
Economics, perfectly competitive markets will deliver first-best
(i.e. Pareto) efficient outcomes.
12 Instances of market failures include: (i) natural monopolies,
monopolistic competition, oligopoly, monopsony, or other failures
of competition; (ii) adverse selection, moral hazard, principal-
agent problems, fraud, simple ignorance or other failures of
information and incentives; and (iii) public goods, thin markets,
transaction costs or other forms of incomplete markets.12
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 17
July 2004
example, regulation may be necessary to curb
any build-up of monopoly power. However,
even though we can compare markets under
perfect competition (the first-best) to all other
possibilities, it cannot be proven which of the
imperfect varieties is preferred (this is the so-
called theorem of the second-best). It may be
that solving one market failure can create
another and may make matters worse. For
example, in the context of financial markets, a
number of studies have shown that too much
pre-trade transparency can actually reduce
market liquidity, because traders are unwilling
to reveal their intentions to trade (Madhavan,
Porter and Weaver, 2002). In similar fashion,
too much post-trade transparency can induce
fragmentation, as traders conduct trades off-
market (i.e. “over-the-counter”).
Moreover, left alone, markets may sometimes
overcome failures and promote self-correcting
mechanisms, at least in the long run. For
example, in the context of repeated interaction
amongst market participants, reputational
considerations may mean that incentives to
exploit, say, an informational advantage to the
detriment of other participants may be naturally
suppressed. Thus, in evaluating any policy
response to market failures, it is important to
assess how far government action should seek
to promote market-led solutions, or whether
more prescriptive forms of intervention are
appropriate.13
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In order to investigate the potential link
between market failures and recent financial
market developments, we need to articulate
what particular market features may have given
rise to greater instability in financial markets.
Four features in particular can be highlighted:
– Perverse incentives/conflicts of interest (i.e.
agency problems).
– Unstable trading strategies (e.g. herding and
cognitive failures).
– Lack of disclosure/transparency (i.e.
asymmetric information issues).
– Concentrated and fragmented ownership
(e.g. collective action problems).
We consider each of these issues in turn,
although it is possible (and indeed likely) that
they may all be present simultaneously. It is not
easy to distinguish which factors might be more
important at particular times. Even with a
formal model with clearly-defined links
between observable market dynamics and
institutional characteristics, any empirical
investigation is unlikely to be able to control for
all the relevant influences on market outcomes.
Because of this, any evidence that we present
below can only be suggestive. To the extent
that securities prices of TMT firms have
been particularly volatile in recent years,
developments in this sector may perhaps
provide especially important insights, and we
therefore highlight characteristics of this sector
in particular where appropriate.
2.1 PERVERSE INCENTIVES/CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
The recent wave of corporate failures brought to
light a number of serious cases of misconduct
of managers and/or of people working in
financial intermediaries which did not fairly
disclose information related to corporations
with which they had business links. The result
of this misconduct was that shareholders were
generally not aware of the real value of their
investment, even though ultimately they were
the ones that bore the financial losses.
The source of this improper behaviour can
usually be related to conflicts of interest arising
in the work environment of the principal-agent
kind. For example, managers of firms may have
an incentive to take excessive risks to gain
financial reward since the shareholders will
ultimately be the ones to suffer if things turn out
badly. Financial intermediaries, acting as
delegated monitors and advisers, can help
investors to control firms’ managers. However,
in so doing they too may face conflicts of
interest. Such conflicts can arise, for example,
between the underwriting and research activity
of investment banks, between the commercial
banking and the investment banking activities
of universal banks, as well as for external
providers of auditing and credit assessment
services (e.g. when the same company is also
selling consulting services). Below, we
examine the empirical evidence on a selection of
these principal-agent problems, concentrating
on those actors that may have the most direct
impact on financial market outcomes, namely
the firms themselves and the financial
institutions which advise them.13
2.1.1 COMPANY EXECUTIVES’ COMPENSATION14
In the US, much has been made of the role of
executive compensation in encouraging
excessive risk-taking. Stock options became a
popular form of remuneration for executives
during the 1990s in particular, since in theory
the provision of stock options was thought to
align their interests with those of the
shareholders. In fact, they turned out to have
other effects: managers had an interest in
2 SOURCES OF MARKET FAILURE
13 For a more comprehensive discussion of such conflicts of
interest, see Crockett et al. (2003).
14 Another area of potential conflict of interests which is not
explored here but which has attracted attention is that of director
and officer (D&O) insurance. This could be seen as a means to
further distort incentives for company directors by ensuring that
the monetary costs arising from any regulatory/judicial
investigations into corporate malfeasance will be met by the firm
and not necessarily by those individuals who are responsible.14
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driving up the stock price of their firm to realise
their gains, exercising their options and then
cashing in upon leaving the company.
Furthermore, particularly in the US, the use of
stock options helped to distort published
earnings, as companies could choose between
expensing employee stock options in their
income statement or disclosing the effect of
such expensing in notes to their accounts. Until
recently, only two publicly traded companies
had chosen the latter alternative.15 The use of
stock options also had the effect of diluting
shares – estimates suggest that the percentage
of firm ownership by top management rose
from 2% to over 10%.16
In Europe, empirical evidence concerning
excessive risk-taking prompted by executive
compensation is scarce and in fact relates
almost exclusively to the UK. This is largely
due to the lack of comprehensive databases on
executive compensation, including stock
options, in continental Europe, which in turn is
related to differences across countries
concerning disclosure requirements. However,
what available information there is suggests
that executives’ pay arrangements in Europe
may, at least in spirit if not in magnitude, be
little different than in the US. A recent survey
by DWS GmbH17 reports that 93% of the largest
fifty European companies offer a stock option
plan to their executives.
2.1.2 UNDERWRITING, RESEARCH AND
BROKERAGE ACTIVITIES IN INVESTMENT
BANKING
Investment banks provide an array of financial
services that bridge informational asymmetries
in the primary and secondary capital markets. In
the primary market, they float new and seasoned
securities and advise on mergers and
acquisitions; in the secondary markets, they act
as brokers or dealers, providing research for
both markets (Bloch, 1986). Equity research
analysts constitute an influential part of the
investment industry. Investors carefully read
their research reports and recommendations,
while firms’ managers try to cultivate good
relationships with them in order to obtain
favourable coverage.18 Brokerage firms
promote research as a means of obtaining
trading business from their investors as well as
underwriting and merger advisory from firms.
A few analysts have attained the status of media
celebrities, and the influence of their
recommendations on stock prices is highlighted
in several academic studies.19
The possible exploitation of information
synergies from underwriting, research and
market-making provides a rationale for
combining these distinct financial services.
However, there are also potential conflicts of
interest between these activities. Boni and
Womack (2002) identify four main areas where
conflicts of interest may arise that potentially
undermine the independence and objectivity of
the advice of analysts working in investment
banks:
– First, internal pressure from the analysts’ firm
with respect to other income derived from
related business. For example, analysts may
have an incentive to provide positive reports
on companies to investors because their firm
will gain greater brokerage commission from
the trade. The firm may gain directly through
its own proprietary trading. Similarly,
analysts may come under pressure to promote
certain companies’ public offerings because of
the corporate financing revenues the firm
generates from the client, or because of their
institutions’ loan exposure to the firm. The
firm may also gain directly through its own
proprietary trading.
15 Under great public pressure in the wake of the Enron and
WorldCom bankruptcies, other companies announced that they
would start expensing stock options. Over 750 companies
(out of about 14,000 publicly traded) have made such
announcements as of July 2004.
16 Figures quoted from Gourevitch (2002).
17 DWS is an asset management company run by Deutsche Bank.
18 Positive investment recommendations can result in firms gaining
access to cheaper financing. This can serve to boost firms’
profitability, which in turn can have a favourable impact on their
share prices.
19 See, for example, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Womack
(1996), Barber et al. (2001). The role played by analysts grew in
importance during the 1990s, especially in some sectors of the
economy, like TMT, where companies took advantage of the high
valuations that analysts were providing to raise capital.15
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– Second, pressure from the management of
the companies that the analyst covers.
Analysts may develop close ties with the
management of the companies they cover,
not least because this could give them access
to privileged information. They may thus be
reluctant to issue negative reports on these
companies for fear of being excluded from
this “inside” information.
– Third, pressure from the analysts’
institutional investor clients. Institutional
investors that own the securities of the
company in question may also be clients of
the analysts’ firms. As a result, an analyst
may be inhibited from issuing a rating
downgrade that would adversely affect the
institutional client’s portfolio, because this
could threaten future brokerage business
from the institution.
– Finally, conflicts created by the analysts’
personal investments. To the extent that
analysts own stocks in the companies they
cover, they may be reluctant to issue sell
recommendations.
In the US, Michaely and Womack (1999)
compare the investment recommendations for
IPOs of those analysts who were the lead
underwriters of the issue with those of other
analysts. They find that the recommendations of
underwriter analysts displayed a significant
positive bias – stocks that they recommended
performed more poorly than “buy”
recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior
to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
recommendation date. Moreover, they show
that the market does not seem to recognise the
full extent of the bias, suggesting that
underwriter analysts can unduly influence
market outcomes.
As an alternative indicator of analyst bias,
Chart 5 shows the ratio of 12-month ahead
earnings expectations relative to the actual
subsequent performance, both for the S&P 500
and the MSCI euro index.20 Market analysts’
profit forecasts would appear to be biased
upwards – actual earnings were almost always
lower than forecasts. This would seem to
suggest that on average over the last 12 years,
analysts have provided a somewhat overly
optimistic outlook for corporate earnings.21
Interestingly, the bias seems to be time-varying
and possibly linked to the profit cycle. This
might suggest analysts are prone to
overestimating the durability of strong profit
growth during economic upswings.
More generally, the existence of the bias does
not necessarily imply that underwriters’
analysts are affected by conflicts of interest.
Analysts could genuinely believe that firms
they underwrite are better than firms
underwritten by other institutions – in the
terminology of behavioural finance, they suffer
cognitive biases. In addition, firms may choose
underwriters because of the favourable views
they have about the firm. That is, the empirical
findings of more favourable recommendations
of underwriters arises from a selection bias –
those firms seeking better recommendations
20 The chart shows MSCI euro index earnings forecasts since data
for the Dow Jones EURO STOXX index are only available from
December 1999.
21 See also the Box entitled “What is the information content of
stock market earnings expectations held by analysts?” in the
March 2004 issue of the ECB Monthly Bulletin.
Chart 5 The upward bias in stock market
analyst forecasts: ratio of forecasts to
subsequent outturns

















































S&P 500 average bias: 16%
MSCI euro average bias: 19%16
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than their fundamental valuations would
deserve tend to turn to particular underwriters.
However, Michaely and Womack (1999)
suggest that since an analyst’s ability to
generate revenues and profit for his or her firm
is a significant factor in his or her remuneration,
the possibility that conflicts of interests are at
work cannot be ruled out.22
In recent years, the emphasis given by market
participants to firms’ earnings performance has
increased, accompanied by more significant
market reactions at the time of the
announcement. An earnings disappointment is
popularly perceived as representing very bad
news. One way in which firms’ managers can
directly manipulate earnings signals is through
reported financial statements, i.e. by choosing
different accounting treatments of revenues and
expenses. An alternative, if indirect, way of
managing market reactions to earnings
announcements is to influence market analysts’
forecasts.
A recent paper by Chan, Karceski and
Lakonishkok (2003) – henceforth CKL –
examines whether analysts adjust their profit
estimates in order to help managers match or
exceed expectations. They show that in the US,
the proportion of positive earnings surprises (the
difference between actual quarterly earnings per
share and the most recent consensus forecast
prior to the announcement data) persistently
outweighs that of negative surprises. They
suggest that this is consistent with analysts
massaging their forecasts to engineer good
news.23 This tendency has increased over time,
22 Survey evidence would also seem to suggest that analysts
themselves are aware of the potential conflicts of interest they
face. A Reuters Survey in 2000 reported that individual analysts
were very concerned about the pressures that the companies they
monitor can exert (see The Reuters Survey 2000, European
Larger Company, Investment Research, Sales & Trading,
Investment Banking (Originated by Tempest)).
23 The time window between the consensus forecast and the
announcement date is short, so it is unlikely that there is a systematic
bias owing to unexpectedly favourable overall economic
conditions. Therefore, CKL argue that there is no reason to expect
that the probability of a positive surprise should differ notably from
the probability of a negative surprise, even if business conditions
had been unexpectedly robust in the late 1990s.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Sample period Mean Median Std. deviation 25th percentile 75th percentile
1984 Q2-1989 Q4 -5.8 -0.86 37.76 -8.71 4.78
1990 Q1-1994 Q4 -1.93 0.02 16.69 -4.37 3.28
1995 Q1-1998 Q4 0.54 0.76 7.87 -0.98 2.79
1999 Q1-2000 Q1 1 1 8.19 -0.2 3.4
2000 Q2-2001 Q1 0.06 0.75 10 -0.88 3.15
Overall -2.32 0.01 20.72 -4.53 3.68
Panel B: Percentage of positive, negative, zero and small surprises 1)
Percentage of cases:
Sample period Positive Negative Zero Small positive Small negative
1984 Q2-1989 Q4 43.3 51.13 5.58 13.98 13.32
1990 Q1-1994 Q4 46.36 43.92 9.73 16.92 12.93
1995 Q1-1998 Q4 53.91 29.81 16.28 24.32 11.29
1999 Q1-2000 Q1 59.48 24.41 16.11 22.58 8.17
2000 Q2-2001 Q1 54.95 28.45 16.6 20.94 9.3
Overall 48.57 40.69 10.74 18.32 12.11
Table 1 Summary statistics and frequency distribution of earnings surprises –
United States
Source: Chan, Karceski and Lakonishkok (2003).
1) The earnings surprise for each firm in each quarter is the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the most recent
consensus forecast prior to the announcement date. Earnings surprises are measured in cents per share (based on number of shares
outstanding as at the date of the earnings announcement) and computed for all firms with forecasts for at least five analysts. Numbers
reported in the table are averages over all quarters, from 1984 Q2 to 2001 Q1.17
ECB





and became particularly important in the late
1990s (see Table 1). Moreover, CKL document
that the increased tendency for positive surprises
became more prevalent in the late 1990s for so-
called growth stocks relative to value stocks.24
They suggest that this is intuitive – many growth
firms, particularly those in the TMT sectors, were
“intensively engaged in raising capital as well as
merger activity. Firms and analysts would thus
have been especially anxious to paint a rosy
picture of those firms’ earnings prospects in
order to maintain favourable investor sentiment.”
A concrete example is Enron – almost until the
day Enron stopped trading on US exchanges,
equities analysts from leading US brokerage and
investment banking houses, which had significant
corporate finance business with Enron,
maintained “buy” recommendations on the stock.
CKL extended their analysis to a number of
other countries, although financial disclosure
requirements outside the US meant that only
annual, rather than quarterly, observations on
corporate earnings and analysts’ forecasts
could be considered. Their results are
reproduced in Table 2. In marked contrast to the
US, there is no evidence of a predisposition to
positive surprises in the pooled sample of
foreign markets (panel A).
The results for continental Europe (panel D)
suggest that the proportion of negative
surprises exceeded 50% in every sub-period, so
that the median surprise was less than zero in all
sub-periods, including the peak years of 1998-
199925. As in the US, there is some evidence
that the incidence of positive earnings surprises
increased during the late 1990s, but the
shift was much milder than in the US – the
proportion of positive surprises stood around
37% during the late 1980s, rising to around
47% in 1998-1999 (compared with comparable
figures of 43% and 60% for the US). On this
basis, therefore, even though there was a
similar stock market boom in both areas, it
would seem that analysts in continental Europe
were less prone to massaging earnings
compared with US analysts. To support this
view, CKL suggest that the investment banking
industry is less developed in Europe and the
role of analysts much less visible, so that the
potential conflicts of interest that undermine
analysts’ research tend to be weaker in markets
outside the US. The relatively larger role of
institutional investors in Europe compared with
the US may also arguably have given them more
influence in insisting upon more objectivity in
analysts’ research and investment advice.26
How robust is this result? A number of US
firms are also significant players in European
investment banking markets, and therefore
could have contributed to inflating asset prices
there too.27 That said, European universal banks
are also important players in European financial
markets, but provide a relatively larger
proportion of finance to clients via bank loans,
with fewer of those clients being publicly
listed. In this sense, the scope for conflicts of
interest for investment analysts of European
institutions may be genuinely less – European
banks lend to their clients via loan agreements
and do not tend to write research on them.
However, other more direct evidence of
conflicts of interest at work in Europe would
suggest a less benign conclusion. One of the
few studies which exclusively looks at
24 CKL define “value firms” as those whose book-to-market value
of equity ratios exceeds that of the median NYSE firm; growth
firms have positive book-to-market ratios that place them in the
bottom quartile based on NYSE firms.
25 This could also be consistent with the evidence shown in Chart 5,
where it seems that European analysts’ forecasts are even more
upwardly biased than those of their US counterparts.
26 A shareholding culture is more developed in the United States
compared with continental Europe. At the end of 2000, US
households held equity to the value of 147% of GDP, compared
with a figure of 67% for the euro area. One of the reasons behind
this difference could be the difference in social security
benefits. Indeed, the large diffusion of company retirement
accounts implies that US households have large indirect
shareholdings. Nevertheless, the ageing population in the euro
area, which enhances long-term savings, has increased the
importance of “new” financial intermediaries (as opposed to
banks) in the euro area, as funds are increasingly channelled into
mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies.
27 The recent legal action brought by the Louis Vuitton group
(LVMH) against Morgan Stanley for allegedly biased investment
advice that damaged the firm also suggests that these issues do
not solely concern US firms. Ironically, this particular case
centred around adverse investment advice which may have been
influenced by conflicts of interest on account of Morgan
Stanley’s banking relationship with LVMH’s rival, Gucci.18
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European data, albeit only for Italian firms,
is Fabrizio (2002).28 This study examines
analysts’ stock recommendations, producing
results that confirm the existence of biased
analyst behaviour which is assessed to be
linked to conflicts of interest. Three features in
particular are identified. First, there is a strong
prevalence of “buy” recommendations, which
seems to suggest that market analysts refrain
from preparing negative reports. (Alternatively,
as mentioned earlier, it could be consistent with
a selection bias – firms covered in these reports
may typically be ones for which there seem to
be good growth prospects). Second, the bias
seems even more pronounced when companies
Percentage of cases:
Sample period Positive Negative Zero Median
(A) All international
1987-1989 39.4 49.82 10.78 -0.17
1990-1994 38.91 55.08 6.01 -1.27
1995-1997 41.97 54.78 3.25 -1.35
1998-1999 40.41 57.92 1.67 -3.57
2000-2001 39.62 58.96 1.42 -4.82
Overall 39.91 54.87 5.22 -1.85
(B) Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE)
1987-1989 39.89 48.38 11.73 0
1990-1994 39.97 54.22 6.42 -1.04
1995-1997 45.73 50.72 3.55 -0.26
1998-1999 42.33 56.02 1.65 -2.12
2000-2001 42.37 56.24 1.39 -3.16
Overall 41.54 52.86 5.6 -1.1
(C) Japan
1987-1989 53.6 45.91 0.49 1.48
1990-1994 32.47 66.45 1.08 -8.01
1995-1997 45.73 53.22 1.05 -2.44
1998-1999 28.01 71.3 0.69 -14.25
2000-2001 46.76 52.93 0.32 -1.45
Overall 41.24 57.97 0.78 -4.74
(D) Continental Europe
1987-1989 36.77 54.73 8.51 -1.2
1990-1994 35.72 56.21 8.08 -1.49
1995-1997 44.92 51.52 3.56 -0.41
1998-1999 47.06 50.99 1.95 -0.35
2000-2001 42.05 55.93 1.82 -4.13
Overall 40.15 54.24 5.61 -1.42
(E) UK
1987-1989 44.96 31.82 23.23 0.01
1990-1994 47.21 46.75 6.04 0.01
1995-1997 56.87 39.97 3.16 1.13
1998-1999 59 38.86 2.14 1.47
2000-2001 39 60.48 0.53 -5.11
Overall 49.17 43.48 7.65 -0.25
Table 2 Frequency distribution and summary statistics of earning surprises 1)  –
International sample (excl. the United States)
Source: Chan, Karceski and Lakonishkok (2003)
1) The earnings surprise for each firm in each quarter is the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the most recent
consensus forecast prior to the announcement date. Earnings surprises are measured in cents per share (based on number of shares
outstanding as at the date of the earnings announcement) and computed for all firms with forecasts for at least five analysts. Numbers
reported in the table are averages over all years, from 1987 to 2001.
28 Italian regulation requires research reports produced on firms
listed on the Italian stock exchange to be filed with Consob (the
Italian authority which regulates securities exchanges). This
research is used by Consob in its market surveillance activities,
and is archived in the database that was also used for that study.19
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are involved in an IPO or some other corporate
action. In these cases, “non-independent”
analysts (i.e. researchers working for financial
intermediaries closely involved with the issuing
firm) produce almost exclusively positive
recommendations. They also tend to stick to
their view in the first few months following the
issue, even if market conditions drastically
change. Third, the market for equity research is
fairly concentrated, so that eventually “deviant”
behaviour of leading analysts may have a
potentially large impact.
Similarly, Lehar and Randl (2003), in a study of
German banks’ activities in financial markets,
find evidence of conflicts of interest, resulting
in upwardly biased investment reports. They
find that analysts behave strategically by using
their information advantage to release
favourable reports at times when the rest of the
market underestimates earnings, and to
suppress negative information when the market
is overly optimistic.
The recent Parmalat case also poses the question
whether some financial institutions involved
with Parmalat were operating in circumstances in
which conflicts of interest could have arisen.
A number of banks, including European
institutions, had multiple relationships with
Parmalat, which could have been affected by
such conflicts of interest. In particular, these
institutions (i) often contributed to the issuing
and placement of bond and financial instruments;
(ii) provided the company with large amounts
of funding (either loans or bank overdraft
facilities); and (iii) sometimes owned shares in
Parmalat. Investigations are currently proceeding
in order to assess whether these institutions
adequately managed these potential conflicts of
interest when providing advice to investors.
Conflicts of interest can give rise also to insider
trading. The existence and enforcement of
insider trading laws in stock markets is largely
a phenomenon of the 1990s. Insider trading
laws were first established in the United States
in 1934, followed only much later in 1967 by
France. At the beginning of the 1990s, insider
trading was not illegal in most European
countries until the European Union required its
members to apply the European Community
Insider Trading Directive (89/592/EEC of
13 November 1989). Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002) investigate whether the existence and
enforcement of insider trading rules has
affected the firms’ cost of equity (i.e. if
corporations are in effect paying a higher
premium for their financing owing to the
possibility of insider trading). Their main
findings are that while the existence of insider
trading laws does not significantly affect equity
valuation, their enforcement would appear to do
so. They find that average returns decreased
after the introduction of insider trading laws,
and even more noticeably after the first
prosecution had been carried out. Turnover
tends to increase after enforcement, whereas
volatility does not change significantly. Using
different models of the costs of capital, they
find that enforcement has a significant negative
effect on the cost of equity.
2.1.3 COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING
Potential conflicts of interest can arise when
banks engage in both commercial and
investment banking business. Indeed, such
conflicts of interest were arguably a key factor
behind the Glass-Steagall legislation enacted in
the US in 1929, which until relatively recently
separated the two activities. However, the
combination of commercial and investment
banking can have potentially beneficial effects
on market outcomes. By forming long-term
lending relationships and providing transaction
services to firms, commercial banks are likely
to acquire superior knowledge concerning
firms’ creditworthiness. And by combining
commercial and investment banking, a universal
bank can exploit economies of scope in
information collection, so that the issues it
underwrites may be perceived as having better
“certification”.
Of course, the value of this certification can be
offset by any perceived conflict of interest. For
example, an institution that has a commercial20
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lending relationship with a firm may have an
incentive to underwrite and promote a low-
quality issue in order to transfer its loan risk to
uninformed investors. If investors feel that a
bank could exploit its conflict of interest, this
will lead the market to apply a premium to the
securities issued by the universal bank.
However, empirical evidence in the US
covering periods in the 1920s and early 1990s
suggests that certification effects have tended to
dominate the negative effects associated with
conflicts of interest. For example, Puri (1996)
found that prior to 1929, securities
underwritten by bank affiliates were priced at a
lower yield than comparable securities issued
by separate investment banks. There is no
evidence that universal banks inflicted low-
quality securities on the public – on the
contrary, they were generally underwriters of
higher-quality securities.
Using more recent data, Gande, Puri, Saunders
and Walter (1997) examined the characteristics
and pricing of securities underwritten by the top
twenty underwriters from 1993 to 1995. They
found that bank subsidiaries tended to
underwrite smaller issues than independent
investment banks. This is consistent with the
idea that commercial banks tend to assist firms
subject to the greatest informational
asymmetries. Subsidiaries of commercial banks
seemed to provide a significant certification
effect. When the commercial banks had a
significant lending stake in the issuing firm, the
yield paid was lower than for comparable issues
underwritten by investment banks. The yields
were even lower if the issue was used to
refinance part of the commercial bank debt and
when the parent bank still held a stake.
There are no directly comparable empirical
studies on conflicts of interest in European
universal banking. This is partly due to a
comparatively less developed equity culture
coupled with, until very recently, limited
securities issuance activity. It is therefore
difficult to assess how far the research results
for the US can be applied to Europe. That is,
whether the benefits of certification provided
by banks outweigh the effects of conflicts of
interest. However, as noted above, the recent
Parmalat case has renewed interest in this area,
and it seems likely that, going forward,
investors and regulators alike will scrutinise
more carefully how well banks manage such
potential conflicts of interest.
A recent study by Lehar and Randl (2003)
investigates the issue from the perspective of
the investment recommendations of German
universal banks which have long-lasting
lending or equity relationships with their
clients. Their results suggest that affiliated
brokers (i.e. analysts whose brokerage firms
own a stake in a firm) use their superior
information to issue more precise forecasts
relative to the consensus than do non-affiliated
brokers. However, as noted above, they also
find evidence of conflicts of interest in the
sense that earnings forecasts of affiliated
brokers are on average more positive than the
consensus. It is not clear which effect might
dominate. Moreover, their regression results
suggest that the interaction of an information
advantage and conflict of interest effects apply
mostly to banks with small equity stakes in the
firm in question. Analysts working in banks
with large equity investments in a firm seem
less prone to exploit their superior information
and are less likely to issue more favourable
forecasts.
Partial evidence based simply on observations
on the arrangements for securities issuance by
European telecommunications companies over
recent years is inconclusive. Table 3 provides
details of the different relationships between
the main brokers and the major European
telecommunications companies. It shows that,
in a number of cases over the period 1998-2003,
a brokerage firm that was involved in the
underwriting of a bond issuance by the
telecommunications company was also an
arranger of a syndicated loan that was still
outstanding during the period.29 In addition, in
29 A lead arranger in a syndicated loan need not actually take a
tranche of the loan, although in the majority of cases they do,
which can give rise to a conflict of interest.21
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the case of Telefonica, two of the financial
institutions were also shareholders at the time
of the issuance.
However, in terms of brokers’ trade
recommendations there is less evidence that
analysts belonging to those firms which had a
closer commercial relationship with a particular
telecom company made positively biased
recommendations. Table 4 presents
recommendations made by JP Morgan and
CSFB over the late 1990s for the major
European telecommunications companies. In
three of the five cases, JP Morgan’s share of the
underwriting business with the company was
much larger than CSFB’s, yet its published
trade recommendation was no more positive,
and indeed may have been more downbeat. Of
course, CSFB could have been consistently
bullish as regards the telecommunications
sector. Indeed, in the case of Vodafone, where
both companies had few reported commercial
interests, the CSFB recommendation was
perhaps slightly more positive.
No. of times No. of times
involved as involved as
a (joint-) Also involved mandated (co-)
Underwriting bookrunner in syndicated arranger as a % of
Financial intermediary share of bonds a % of total loan outstanding number of loans/ An identified
“Bookrunner”  issued number of during the tranches of loans shareholder
(Top 5 per corporate) (1998-2003) % separate issues period? 1) (1993-2003) of the firm?
Vodafone
Lehman Bros. 33 31 yes 43 no
Salomon-Smith Barney 18 25 no 0 no
Goldman Sachs 16 19 yes 14 no
Deutsche Bank 13 13 yes 43 no
Barclays 10 19 yes 71 no
Telefonica
JP Morgan 22 38 no 0 yes
Morgan Stanley 17 24 no 0 no
Goldman Sachs 15 19 no 0 no
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 7 29 yes 20 yes
Lehman Bros. 5 14 no 0 no
Deutsche Telekom
Deutsche Bank 21 27 yes 75 no
Morgan Stanley 14 21 no 0 no
Goldman Sachs 13 14 no 0 no
JP Morgan 10 10 yes 50 no
BNP 10 11 no 0 no
Telecom Italia
JP Morgan 25 100 yes 25 no
Mediobanca 16 67 yes 50 no
Lehman Bros. 16 67 no 0 no
Merrill-Lynch 16 67 no 0 no
Caboto 9 33 no 0 no
France Telecom
Morgan Stanley 16 31 yes 43 no
BNP 15 33 yes 43 no
Salomon-Smith Barney 12 24 yes 0 no
CSFB 11 16 yes 29 no
Deutsche Bank 9 21 yes 43 no
Table 3 Potential conflicts of interest for brokers – European Telecom Companies
Source: Authors’ calculations (based on data from Bondware/Loanware).
1) Based on details of syndicated loans upon origination. It does not take into account of possible loan sales post-origination.22
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2.1.4 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR RATING
AGENCIES
A number of the potential conflicts of interest
facing investment bank analysts may also affect
analysts working for rating agencies. One
potential conflict of interest is related to the fees
charged by agencies for their rating services,
which constitute a major source of their
revenues. Most ratings are solicited – i.e. firms
request the rating. Hence, if a customer is not
satisfied with an agency’s rating, it may
threaten to switch to a rival agency. To avoid
such loss of business, agencies may have an
incentive to rate issuers more liberally and to
search less eagerly for negative information. As
a result, investors may not receive the most
reliable and objective advice about the
fundamental strength of a company. Another
potential conflict of interest is related to the
development of complementary businesses,
such as advisory services. Although these
services still represent a small portion of the
overall business of rating agencies, the sale of
these additional services may still influence the
ratings attached to firms.
In the case of Enron, the SEC investigation
concluded that rating agencies failed to use their
legally sanctioned powers to investigate the
operations of the company. This could have
been due to conflicts of interest as well as poor
monitoring.
In terms of the impact on market dynamics, the
effects of such conflicts of interest are not clear.
There is some evidence that this potential
ratings bias is to some extent factored into
prices. Studies of the value provided by bond-
rating agencies (e.g. Hand, Holthausen and
Leftwich, 1992) generally conclude that rating
downgrades provide new information to
investors, whereas upgrades are already
reflected in stock and bond prices when they are
announced. Moreover, the behaviour of rating
agencies is often constrained by the fact that the
market requires many issuers to have more than
one rating, suggesting that systematic
overrating by one agency would be easily
identifiable.
However, the conflicts of interest could be more
influential in the ratings of collateralised debt
obligations (CDOs) and other similar synthetic
products. In this case, the rating agency works
alongside an issuer in structuring the
instrument and may be under pressure to choose
the weakest possible bundle of assets that meet
the required overall credit rating. The fact that
such instruments are often only rated by one
company and are not widely understood by
investors increases the risk that any such
Firm Vodafone Telefonica Deutsche Telekom
Broker JP Morgan CSFB JP Morgan CSFB JP Morgan CSFB
(% of underwriting
business with firm
during 1998-2003) 0 0 22 1 10 4
1999 H1 Hold Buy/Hold Sell
1999 H2 Hold/Buy Sell Buy (Yes)
2000 H1 (Yes)
2000 H2 Hold Hold (Yes) Hold (Yes)
2001 H1 Hold/Buy Buy/Hold Hold/Sell (Yes)
2001 H2 Hold Attractive/Buy Sell (Yes) Hold (Yes) Hold (Yes) Attractive (Yes)
2002 H1 Hold/Sell Attractive/Hold Hold/Sell Hold Hold/Buy (Yes) Attractive
2002 H2 Hold/Sell Hold Hold/Sell Hold/Attractive Hold/Buy Attractive/Hold (Yes)
2003 Q1 Hold/Sell Hold Hold/Sell (Yes) Attractive/Hold Hold/Buy Attractive
Table 4 Investment recommendations of JP Morgan and CSFB – European Telecom Companies
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Whether the broker is involved as a bookrunner on bonds issued during that period is shown in brackets.23
ECB





practices might not be detected, and suggests
that the scope for ratings manipulation may
potentially be higher than for more basic
products.30
2.2 DESTABILISING TRADING AND
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
Instability in financial markets may come about
not necessarily as a result of “bad” incentive
problems, but simply through the optimising
behaviour of investors who, faced with
imperfect information, individually pursue
particular strategies that are destabilising for
the market as a whole. There are a number of
candidate strategies that can in theory lead to
greater volatility in markets – for example
dynamic hedging, herding, “noise-trading”31,
etc. The difficult empirical question is how
important they might have been in contributing
to the increased volatility in financial markets in
recent years, in both the US and Europe.
2.2.1 COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
A number of authors have suggested that the
development of complex financial instruments
(e.g. synthetic options) may in itself have
generated the potential for greater volatility in
financial markets; see for example Jacobs
(1998).32 The argument typically runs as
follows. Option market-makers and dealers will
try to hedge any risk they face as quickly as
possible. Ideally, they will be able to find a
speculator willing to take on their short option
position, but overall they will only be able to do
so when investors’ desire to sell options is in
rough equilibrium with their desire to buy them.
Alternatively, market-makers and dealers may
attempt to hedge their short positions by buying
options. However, OTC dealers who have sold
tailored options with specifications in liquid
markets may find that they cannot synthesise an
offsetting position using exchange-traded
options. When equity option traders cannot
offset the risk of holding short option positions
by either of these routes, they will have to
hedge in equity futures, and possibly in the
stock markets. Yet, such hedging will mean
buying as equity prices rise and selling as
equity prices fall – i.e. positive feedback
trading.
Recently the argument that new risk
management techniques can potentially
destabilise markets has resurfaced in the
context of the development of the credit
derivatives market. Persaud (2002) and the
CMF (2002) both assert that by increasing the
connection between the market for credit risk
and equity markets, credit derivatives have
acted as an additional driver for financial
market volatility. A recent survey of the global
credit derivatives market by Fitch-IBCA
suggested that European banks and (re)insurers
have been  active sellers of credit risk protection
through the credit derivatives market, more so
than their US counterparts. Persaud argues that
this is one reason why European equity markets
have been weaker and more volatile than US
markets, even though the largest downward
revisions to growth expectations have occurred
in the US. He suggests that European insurers
have sought to hedge their increased credit
exposure through short-selling equities much
more than US insurance companies, which has
30 For more discussion of the influence of ratings agencies on
financial markets see Gonzalez et al. (2004).
31 Noise traders take market positions based on non-fundamental
information, for example chart formations, technical signals, and
investing fads. In theory, people who trade more or less at
random will eventually be driven out of the market by investors
trading on views about the fundamental valuations of firms such
as potential earnings growth. However, a number of models have
been developed that show that irrational traders can survive and
dominate in a competitive market, even with no limits on
arbitrage. Moreover, these results do not hinge on investor size
– in these models, small irrational traders can change stock price
movements and induce a large hedging demand in rational
traders (see for example Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield,
2002).
32 From a theoretical perspective it is not clear why financial
innovations should lead to greater volatility in financial markets.
Indeed, Citanna and Schmedders (2002) and Basak (2002)
develop general equilibrium models that demonstrate that
financial innovations actually reduce volatility. However, a
number of empirical studies have argued that automatic trading
rules based on portfolio insurance and dynamic hedging
techniques contributed to particular episodes of financial market
volatility, for example the stock market “crash” in September
1987 and the market turbulence in Autumn 1998. Yet, as noted in
Jorion (2002), this view is not universally held, and a number of
empirical papers find no such link between financial innovation
and market volatility.24
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contributed to greater stock market volatility in
Europe. However, since the main reference
entities are not exclusively European, and
indeed include some large US corporates, it is
not clear why insurers would hedge credit risk
exclusively in European markets, unless there
was a currency hedging issue or the US firms
had dual listings.
Another recent example of market instability
that may arise from the development of complex
financial instruments as well as risk
management practices is related to the
development of the US mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) market and the activity of the
government-sponsored agencies, primarily
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These institutions
were established to provide liquidity to the US
mortgage market. Their primary activity
consists in issuing MBS written on bundles of
mortgages originated by commercial banks. At
the same time, and increasingly so, they also
directly purchase various mortgage-related
securities, including the repurchase of their
own MBS from investors in the open market.
The majority of US residential mortgage
contracts provide borrowers with the option to
prepay the mortgage. This option is typically
exercised when interest rates go down, as it
becomes financially convenient to repay the
mortgage at the established rate and take on a
new mortgage loan at the current, lower interest
rates. The existence of this option greatly
enhances the interest rate risk of the MBS.
Mortgage security investors are actively
engaged in managing the interest rate risk
exposure in their portfolio; the agencies in
particular now use a combination of “dynamic
hedging” activities.33
In the summer of 2003, US government bond
yields fluctuated significantly, increasing
sharply from the historically low levels reached
in mid-June 2003. Developments in the swap
and government bond markets over the same
period suggest that the hedging activities of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might have had a
significant impact on the prices determined in
these markets.34
2.2.2 SIDE-EFFECTS OF REGULATION
Regulatory policies can also lead to positive
feedback investment behaviour. For example, in
order to assess investment risk, some European
regulators have developed stress or resilience
tests to evaluate the soundness of insurance
companies and to assess whether additional
provisions are required to bolster solvency
positions. Denmark, France, Ireland and the UK
require life insurance companies to stress test
their investments held at market value. Such
regulations are a way of introducing ex ante
requirements for risks related to equity
holdings that are ignored in standard solvency
regulations. However, the effect of these sorts
of stress tests can be that insurers are forced to
sell equities as equity prices decline. Selling
equities and thus reducing holdings may reduce
the risk of breaching regulatory solvency
minima. However, this can give rise to a
downward market spiral, as forced selling leads
to further falls in share prices.35
Constraints on short selling in asset markets
can also potentially be a destabilising factor.
The presence of constraints causes asymmetry
in the market, as those who think that the asset
33 For this purpose, they trade their loan portfolio, use hedging
derivatives and trade their own debt, changing the ratio between
short-term and long-term debt and thus also the average maturity
of their liabilities. They can also enter the Treasury market – by
buying or selling government bonds – and the swap market in
order to alter the average maturity of their financing obligations.
Because of the size of their MBS holdings, the potential
magnitude of this type of hedging activity is large.
34 Perli and Sack (2003) found evidence that hedging activity
related to the mortgage market tends to amplify movements in the
ten-year swap rate. The results indicate that these effects are
statistically significant and considerable in magnitude.
35 In the period immediately following September 2001, the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) eased the resilience test used
to determine the capacity of UK life insurers’ investment
portfolios to absorb losses. They quoted the potential positive
feedback effects of forced selling as one reason for temporarily
relaxing the resilience test. Other EU insurance regulators chose
to relax their rules by other means. A number of insurance
regulators (e.g. Germany) relaxed valuation principles. Instead
of valuing equities at a minimum of market value and costs,
insurance companies were allowed to value equities at cost, even
if this was higher than the market value. Furthermore, German
life insurers have created an emergency fund to rescue
insurance companies that experience solvency problems. In
Switzerland, the government announced a reduction in the
mandatory minimum return rate on life insurance policies.25
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is overvalued cannot affect the price. One
implication of this is that, in a period of asset
price inflation, an important proportion of
sceptics tend to be disenfranchised from the
market. Of the set of agents who do not own the
asset already, only those who think that the
price is going to increase can invest by taking a
long position. In this way, the absence of
completeness in financial markets can impart an
upward bias to financial asset prices and may
accordingly be a factor in contributing to asset
price misalignments.
The impact of short selling on financial market
outcomes is the subject of intense debate. Some
commentators, including some regulators, are
suspicious that short selling can exacerbate
market crashes. Most academic researchers,
however, make a strong theoretical case for
allowing short sales in markets, based upon the
notion that markets exist to facilitate the
efficient pricing of assets, and that restricting
short sales reduces market efficiency. A number
of empirical studies, particularly Jones and
Lamont (2001), provide some support for the
hypothesis that difficulties in short selling are
associated with security mispricing. However, a
more recent paper by Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu
(2003) finds empirical evidence in support of
both views. Specifically, in markets where
short selling is either prohibited or not
practised, individual stocks are less likely to
exhibit extreme returns. However, the authors
find little compelling evidence that short sale
constraints prevent or mitigate severe price
declines at the level of the market as a whole.
2.2.3 HERDING BEHAVIOUR
Another class of destabilising trading
behaviour may result from market participants
taking similar positions to those of other
participants rather than basing their decisions
explicitly on prices. When position-taking is
undertaken strictly by following others’
positions, it is frequently termed herding. The
root causes of herding are numerous, although
as Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) suggest,
the three most important ones are imperfect
information, concern for reputation and
compensation structures:
• Information-based herding – traders may
mimic the behaviour of an initial group of
investors in the erroneous belief that this
group is better informed;
• Reputation-based herding – investment
managers may tend to copy each others’
strategies if taking a contrary position may
damage their reputation (“the trend is my
friend”);
• Compensation-based herding – if a trader’s
compensation depends on how his/her
performance compares to other investors’
performance, this may encourage herding.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish
empirically which form of herding is likely to
be more prevalent at any one time, not least
because of the lack of information on the
underlying motives for the trades. It is also
difficult to know whether market participants
are genuinely reacting in similar fashion to
news about a certain situation.36 However,
certain institutional features related to the
behaviour of intermediaries might potentially
accentuate herding behaviour. For example,
analysts’ recommendations may be influenced
by each other, and rating agencies tend to move
together when making changes to a company’s
rating. Both of these tendencies could be
influenced by the degree of concentration in the
particular segment of the financial industry. For
instance, small research firms may feel
constrained in making recommendations that
deviate from those of the large investment
banks if they feel that the market power of the
large firms may move investor sentiment
against contrary views. In this way, herding
biases could be reinforced.
36 This is sometimes known as “spurious” herding, where groups of
investors face similar decision problems and information sets and
take similar decisions. Such spurious herding can be an efficient
outcome in the sense that investors evaluate their optimal
behaviour on the basis of available information; it just
so happens that a number of investors tend to make similar
investment assessments so that their actions are correlated.26
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Herding need not entail any irrationality on the
part of investors; indeed, it may be entirely
rational to follow the behaviour of others.
However, other models have been developed
which depart from the full rationality
assumption and attempt to understand better
and explain how emotions and cognitive
errors influence investors’ decision-making
processes. In particular, various authors have
argued that analysts’ recommendations and
earnings forecasts may suffer from cognitive
biases – for example, a tendency to place less
weight on the possibility of bad outcomes the
greater the time has elapsed since they last
occurred.37
2.2.4 INDUSTRY PRACTICES
A recent study by the BIS (2003)38 identified a
number of structural features in the institutional
asset management industry which might limit
the ability or willingness of institutional asset
managers to help correct any mispricing in
financial markets. In particular:
– A narrowing of investment mandates and an
increase in passive management.
Increasingly, specialist asset managers who
invest in a smaller class of selected assets
have become common in many countries.
Similarly, passive (index-based) investment
strategies have grown in importance. Both
features may mean that asset managers have
less discretion to hold contrary views.
– Evaluation of performance against peer-
group benchmarks. Even if an asset manager
is not tightly constrained in terms of asset
portfolio choice, he or she may not have an
incentive to deviate too far from what others
are doing simply because his/her
performance will be judged relative to his/
her peers. The study noted a widespread
decline in the reliance on peer-based
benchmarks during the 1990s. However, the
concomitant increase in market benchmarks
may potentially give rise to the same
sort of problems – evaluating investment
performance relative to a (limited) number of
market indices may mean that an asset
manager is better off, at least in the short
run, by adopting a position close to his/her
peers. More generally, such relative
performance measurement may encourage
herding behaviour, in the sense that asset
managers simply follow what others are
doing in selecting their investment
strategies, although formal empirical
analysis of this phenomenon has so far failed
to uncover any robust evidence.
– Consolidation in the asset management
industry (and the associated investment
research industry) could affect the process of
information-gathering and aggregation. This
in turn could reduce the quantity and quality
of information available to investors.
However, the same study also noted a number
of counterbalancing trends that could serve
to offset any reduction in institutional
investors’ ability to transact to reduce price
misalignments. These include a broadening in
the choice of available investments, which
could reduce the potential for highly correlated
investment behaviour; the “retailisation” of
asset management, with a more diffuse investor
base making asset allocation decisions; and,
perhaps most important, the widespread use of
fixed asset allocations which are chosen at
periodic intervals. These would provide a
source of negative feedback trading and thereby
limit volatility. As an example of the latter, a
fund invested in bonds and equities with a cap
of 60% on holdings of either asset class would
be forced to liquidate equity holdings if market
developments raised the value of equities in the
portfolio above this threshold.
37 In the terminology of cognitive psychologists, this is known as the
availability heuristic. Another heuristic that has been found to
characterise behaviour with regard to low-probability, high-loss
events is the threshold heuristic – the tendency to assign a zero
probability to very unlikely but still possible outcomes.
38 The empirical information for the report was based on two
rounds of interviews with more than 100 industry practitioners
representing the various sectors of the institutional asset
management industry in 14 countries.27
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Overall, the report concluded that it was
impossible to assess accurately the net effect on
market efficiency and volatility of these
countervailing developments in institutional
asset management. It is therefore uncertain
whether and to what extent changes in the
structure of the asset management industry have
affected the ability of institutional investors to
counter asset pricing errors. Furthermore,
anecdotal evidence provides little support for
the view that the late 1990s bubble was
accentuated by the trading behaviour of
institutional investors. Nonetheless, the report
points to short-lived misalignments along these
lines that appear to have been present during
particular episodes and which could have been
influenced by institutional behaviour.
In terms of cross-country differences, the
interviews conducted with market participants
did not suggest that there were significant
differences in institutional asset management
practices between Europe and elsewhere.
2.3 LACK OF DISCLOSURE/TRANSPARENCY
Following the recent corporate scandals, a
number of commentators have highlighted the
issue of information disclosure as a key
contributory factor in the build-up of corporate
vulnerability and the subsequent instability in
financial markets. In particular, financial
accounting information is a key quantitative
indicator on which investors rely: without
accurate and reliable accounting information,
market discipline can be undermined.
2.3.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003)
– henceforth BPS – suggest three channels
through which financial accounting information
can influence financial markets. First, better
financial accounting information helps
investors identify promising investment
opportunities, thereby decreasing estimation
risk – in the absence of reliable and accessible
information, human and financial capital may
not flow to the most productive uses, and this
uncertainty thus increases a firm’s cost of
capital. Second, objective and verifiable
accounting information can facilitate
monitoring by shareholders and thus reduce
opportunities for managers to serve their
own personal interests. Third, better financial
reporting can reduce information asymmetries
among investors – reducing, for example, the
costs associated with adverse selection
problems.39
However, the degree of information disclosure
is not simply a matter of the quantity of
disclosure. More important perhaps is the quality
(e.g. its relevance, timeliness, consistency,
comparability, accuracy, etc.) of the information.
D’Avolio, Gidor and Schleifer (2001) –
henceforth DGS – suggest that there are four key
requirements for a well-functioning securities
market: “the availability of accurate information,
the existence of a broad base of investors with
access to this information, legal protection of
these investors’ rights, and a liquid secondary
market unencumbered by excessive transaction
costs or constraints.” DGS posit that advances in
information and communication technology have
greatly affected the amount, type and speed of
information that is disseminated to investors.
Such developments have also lowered barriers to
entry, hence expanding the investor base and
increasing trading volumes. Less certain is the
effect on investors’ rights. On the one hand,
technology in conjunction with new regulation is
levelling the playing field for individual
investors, for example facilitating conference
calls between firms’ management and the general
public via live Internet telecasts. On the other
hand, improvements in technology have made it
easier for insiders and financial intermediaries to
trade quickly on private information. Moreover,
39 As documented in Amihud and Mendelson (2000), a major
component of liquidity premia is related to adverse selection
costs, which are reflected in bid-ask spreads. By pre-committing
themselves to the timely disclosure of high quality financial
accounting information, firms reduce investors’ risk of loss
associated with trading with informed investors. This in turn
should encourage more funds to enter capital markets and lower
the liquidity premia demanded by investors.28
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DGS suggest that the quality of information may
not have kept pace with the quantity of available
information. With trading costs falling, the
marginal investor is likely to be less experienced
and sophisticated and less able to derive the
fundamental value of traded securities from the
available information. However, newly listed
companies are often less likely to generate the
internal cash flow sufficient to finance their
investments in the short term. A high stock price
may therefore become an even more important
indicator of the financial health of these firms.
Both these features may combine to create strong
incentives for firms to distort information
released to investors. Indeed, DGS show
evidence in the US of deterioration in the quality
of information that firms supply to investors,
which serves partly to offset any improvements
owing to technological advances. Reinforcing
this argument, Standard & Poor’s announced in
May 2002 a new set of definitions to evaluate the
operating performance of publicly quoted
companies in the United States, with the aim of
partly restoring investor confidence.40 Following
the collapse of Enron, substantial differences in
alternative published profit measures of listed
companies have come to light (in particular
between the so-called pro-forma figures and the
earnings reported to the SEC), significantly
increasing uncertainties among investors over
the transparency and reliability of the
information disclosed by corporations. Jensen
and Fuller (2002) argue that Wall Street equity
analysts and company executives may engage in a
“profit expectations game” which ultimately
creates an incentive for the companies to disclose
inaccurate information.41
2.3.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Despite the complex nature of any relationship
between information disclosure and investor
behaviour, a recent paper by Bhattacharya,
Daouk and Welker (2002) – hereafter BDW –
has found evidence of a link between the
transparency of accounting reports and
financial market outcomes, at least in a cross-
country setting. Specifically, using panel
regressions these authors consider how the
degree of opacity in firms’ reported earnings in
different countries affects both the level of
equity prices and the level of trading in stocks.
A metric for earnings opacity is constructed
from measures that seek to capture three
different ways in which financial accounting
information may be manipulated:
(i) Earnings aggressiveness – the tendency to
delay the recognition of losses and speed
the recognition of gains. BDW proxy this
by the median amount of accruals (divided
by total assets) in each country on the
basis that aggressive accounting would be
characterised by fewer negative accruals
that capture losses, and more positive
accruals that capture economic gains.
(ii) Loss avoidance – the possibility that firms
may try to engineer positive reported
earnings, even if they are small, rather
than reveal actual losses. BDW construct
a ratio based on the number of firms with
small positive earnings (between 0 and
1% of total assets), minus the number of
firms with small negative earnings
(between 0 and -1% of total assets)
divided by their sum. The higher this ratio
is in country i, in year t, the higher the
suspected loss avoidance.
(iii) Earnings smoothing – the possibility that
firms may try to make reported earnings
smoother over time than their underlying
economic performance would warrant.
Following previous authors, BDW
calculate the correlation between the change
in accruals and the actual change in cash
flows (both scaled by lagged total assets) in
country i, year t. The more negative the
correlation, the more likely it is that
earnings smoothing is obscuring variability
in the underlying economic performance.
40 See Standard & Poor’s (2002).
41 These incentives seemed to stem from the conflicts of interest
associated with the use of executive stock options and the
structure of analysts’ compensation packages.29
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For all three dimensions of earnings opacity, a
country is assigned a rank between 1 and 10 for
each year, depending on which decile of the
distribution across all country-years the
Earnings Overall earnings
aggressiveness 2) Loss avoidance 3) Earnings smoothing 4) opacity 5)
Least, 1 Portugal Brazil Turkey United States
Belgium Mexico United States Norway
Netherlands Australia Brazil Portugal
Germany United States Norway Brazil
Switzerland Norway Mexico Belgium
United States Ireland Canada Mexico
Denmark Denmark Australia Canada
2 France France Taiwan France
Spain United Kingdom Spain Australia
Finland Belgium France Spain
Austria Sweden Thailand United Kingdom
Canada Portugal Sweden Denmark
Thailand Canada United Kingdom Switzerland
Norway Hong Kong India Sweden
3 Italy Netherlands Hong Kong Germany
United Kingdom South Africa Portugal Netherlands
Pakistan Austria Indonesia Finland
Ireland Singapore Malaysia Austria
Australia South Korea Switzerland Thailand
Sweden Malaysia Finland Ireland
Singapore Germany Singapore Hong Kong
4 Taiwan Italy Belgium Singapore
Chile Spain South Africa Taiwan
Japan Switzerland Austria Turkey
South Africa Japan Germany South Africa
Brazil Finland Ireland Malaysia
Mexico Pakistan Pakistan Italy
Hong Kong Chile Denmark Pakistan
Most, 5 Malaysia Greece Chile Japan
South Korea Turkey Greece Chile
Indonesia Taiwan Japan India
India Thailand Netherlands Indonesia
Greece India Italy South Korea
Turkey Indonesia South Korea Greece
Table 5 Earnings opacity ranking of countries 1)
Source: Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2002)
Note: EU countries are in bold.
1) The data used to construct the earnings opacity variables are sourced from Worldscope.
2) BDW scale accruals by lagged total assets for each firm, determine its median in the cross-section of firms per country per year, and
then rank these medians across years and countries. This rank is the “earnings aggressiveness” per country.
3) BDW define firms with small positive earnings (small negative earnings) as firms with net income between 0 and 1% (between 0 and
-1%) of lagged total assets. They subtract the number of firms with small negative earnings from the number of firms with small positive
earnings per country per year, divide this difference by the sum of the two, and then rank this ratio across years and across countries.
This rank is the “loss avoidance” variable per country.
4) BDW find the correlation between the change in accruals and the change in operating cash flows (both scaled by lagged total assets)
in the cross-section of firms per country per year, and then rank these correlations across years and across countries. This rank is the
“earnings smoothing” variable per country.
5) The “overall earnings opacity” measure is the average of the “earnings aggressiveness”, “loss avoidance” and the “earnings
smoothing” variable per country.
particular observation appears in. BDW then
average these rankings to obtain a single time
series of overall earnings opacity for each
country. Table 5 summarises their country30
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rankings. In terms of the overall earnings
opacity measure, European countries feature
near the middle of the distribution of countries.
The United States has the least amount of
earnings opacity, followed by Norway, whereas
Greece, South Korea and Indonesia show the
most severe earnings opacity in the sample.42
However, this aggregate measure masks a
slightly different picture when specific
components of earnings opacity are considered.
Specifically, earnings aggressiveness appears
less of an issue for most European countries
while, in contrast, there is more evidence that
European firms seek to smooth their earnings.
To investigate the link between information
disclosure and financial markets, BDW estimate
a number of panel regression models that posit a
relationship between selected equity market
indicators and their earnings opacity measures.
Table 6 summarises their results. BDW’s
overall earnings opacity measure is positively
associated with the cost of equity, which is
measured in two different ways: via a dividend
discount model (DDM), and using an
international asset pricing factor model (IAPF).
More specifically, an increase in overall
earnings opacity from the 25th percentile rank
to the 75th percentile rank is associated with
around a 3% increase in the cost of equity (for
both DDM and IAPF). However, the source of
this association differs with the cost of equity
measure; for the DDM-based measure, the key
component would appear to be earnings
aggressiveness, whereas for the IAPF model,
the relationship is driven by the loss avoidance
variable.
The potential link between opacity and prices is
mirrored in the relationship with the trading
quantity variable, with turnover falling as
earnings opacity rises. An increase in overall
earnings opacity from the 25th percentile rank
to the 75th percentile rank is associated with
around a 9% decrease in annual trade in stocks
from that country.
Since it is difficult to control effectively for
other factors that might explain the correlation
between earnings opacity and financial market
outcomes (especially the potential effect of a
key omitted variable that could simultaneously
affect both), it is important not to draw causal
inferences from such empirical analysis.
Nonetheless, the regressions at least suggest
the potentially important influence of
information disclosure on financial market
dynamics.
Of course, set against the background of the
recent spate of corporate scandals, the puzzle is
why, if accounting transparency is relatively
greater in the US, corporate malfeasance has
so far been more prolific there. Some
commentators have pointed to the weaknesses
of accounting standards in the US and in
particular the reliance on specific rules which
can be manipulated, rather than principles. A
review of the relative merits of different
accounting regimes is beyond the scope of this
paper; however, it should be noted that to some
extent this debate may miss the point, as the
recent US corporate scandals were largely due
to fraud and breakdowns in auditing which
could have occurred in any accounting
jurisdiction. This point is reinforced by the
Parmalat case, in which fraud was again a
central feature.
Financial accounting information can only ever
provide a snapshot of the health and viability of a
firm. The key issue is, given the innovations in
risk management and financial engineering over
recent years, whether traditional financial
reporting has become much less meaningful.
Innovations such as securitisation and
derivatives products facilitate the use of
sophisticated financial structures. Consequently
outsiders (i.e. investors) may have more
difficulty understanding the risk positions of
many large, complex organisations using
traditional accounting information. Again the
Parmalat case provides a concrete example of
how opacity can develop in financial reporting
42 The cross-country ranking is broadly consistent with other
studies of accounting transparency – see for example Bushman,
Piotroski and Smith (2003).31
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Panel regression results 1)
Dependent variable Cost of equity Stock turnover 4)
Using DDM 2) Using asset pricing factor model 3)
Independent variables
Earnings aggressiveness +ve*** -ve -ve***
Loss avoidance +ve +ve*** +ve
Earnings smoothing +ve +ve -ve***
Overall earnings opacity +ve*** +ve* -ve***
o/w controls:
Liberalisation 5) -ve -ve*** +ve***
Insider trading enforcement 6) -ve** -ve +ve***
GDP growth 7) ve*** +ve -ve
Foreign exchange risk 8) +ve***
Liquidity +ve**
Table 6 Effect of earnings opacity on equity market indicators
Source: Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2002)
1) Sign of coefficient estimates from panel regressions which include country-fixed-effects, country-specific heteroscedasticity and
country-specific autocorrelation.  ***, ** and * imply significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels.
2) Dividend discount model.
3) The dependent variable is the residual (eit) from an international asset pricing factor model:
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where it-j is the innovation in monthly return of the stock market index of country i at time t-j, j{0,1,2,3}; ewt-j is the innovation in monthly
return of the stock market index of the world at time t-j, j{0,1,2,3}
4) The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market
capitalisation at the end of the month.
5) The control variable “liberalisation” is an indicator variable per country. It changes from 0 to 1 after the liberalisation date used in
Bekaert and Harvey (2000).
6) The control variable “insider trading enforcement” is an indicator variable. It changes from 0 to 1 after the first enforcement of
insider trading laws. This date was obtained from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).
7) The control variable “GDP growth” is the growth rate of gross domestic product of a country each year.
8) The control variable “foreign exchange risk” is estimated from a multivariate ARCH model.
and in turn undermine market discipline. The
Parmalat group set up around 180 offshore
entities or special purpose vehicles (SPVs),
including most notably a legal vehicle called
“Buconero” – or “black hole” – through which
some of the fraudulent transactions were
processed.43 Such special purpose vehicles,
which are widely used by corporations both in
the US and Europe, often to achieve tax savings,
can make it difficult for an investor to evaluate
the financial position of a company, not least
because they can be used to prevent full details of
transactions showing up in company accounts.
2.4 CONCENTRATED AND FRAGMENTED
OWNERSHIP
2.4.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
As well as information disclosure, the
ignominious failures of Enron and WorldCom in
the US, and the Parmalat scandal in Europe, have
given rise to a more general debate about the
effectiveness of corporate governance in
controlling firms’ management. In the stylised
43 There are parallels here with the case of Enron, where offshore
vehicles were also given obscure names such as Jedi, LJM and
Raptor, which gave no indication of the underlying businesses.32
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(textbook) market model, many investors acting
independently may not be able to exert control
over firms’ behaviour. There is a clear separation
between ownership and control. In particular, it
may not be in the interests of individuals to
invest considerable resources in monitoring
management if they possess too few votes
to affect decisions – i.e. there could be a
coordination problems among investors. More
formally, this is a problem of many principals (i.e.
shareholders) seeking to monitor their agents (i.e.
managers).44 In this situation, collective action
problems may undermine market discipline: there
may be no incentive to monitor firms because
others will free-ride. Consequently, excesses may
build up which require more radical correction
which in turn may imply greater volatility in
financial market prices.
The potential for such collective action
problems is increased if firm ownership is
highly dispersed as in the US/UK system – the
so-called shareholder model.45 Such fragmented
ownership creates the need for external
monitors, so-called reputational intermediaries,
who review and analyse information on the
activities of the firm with the aim of ensuring
that managers act in the interests of the firm’s
shareholders. Unfortunately, recent corporate
scandals have revealed the potential weakness
of these arrangements, namely that reputational
intermediaries may, at best, be ineffective in
controlling firms’ management and, at worst,
may collude with firms’ management and each
other at the expense of other shareholders.
An alternative model linking firm ownership and
control, which is more common in Europe, is the
so-called stakeholder model. The stakeholder
system overcomes the collective action problem
by allowing concentrated ownership of shares, or
“blockholding”. Substantial shareholders may
have a strong incentive to monitor the firm, as
they know they will be listened to and their risk is
greater. They effectively become “insiders”, and
as such are able to share information with
managers. The stakeholder system encourages
information sharing because the economic fates
of the respective parties are tied together. In
addition, extensive cross-shareholding and
coordination mechanisms prevent the
opportunism that sharing of information may
otherwise provoke. Furthermore, it is argued that
insiders are more likely to act as “patient” capital
– shareholders that stress value over the long haul
and are less responsive to short-term fluctuations
in sentiment.
Table 7 presents details of ownership
structures, or more precisely voting rights,
across different countries. The data are quite
old - most observations refer to the mid/late
1990s, as they are based on information
disclosed under the Large Holdings Directive
(88/627/EEC) in the European Union and
Section 13 in the US. However, trends in
ownership are typically slow moving, so the
data are likely to be still relevant.
In 50% of non-financial listed companies in
Belgium, Germany, Italy and Austria, a single
blockholder (an individual investor or group of
investors) controls more than 50% of voting
rights. In 50% of Dutch, Spanish and Swedish
companies, more than 43.5%, 34.5% and 34.9%
of votes respectively are controlled by a single
blockholder. In contrast, the median
blockholder in the UK controls only 9.9% of
votes, while in the US the median size of
blockholding of companies quoted on both
NASDAQ and NYSE is just above the
disclosure level of 5% (8.6% and 5.4%).46
44 More specifically, there is a collective principal, in this case the
dispersed shareholders. This should be distinguished from the
case of multiple principals who each have separate contracts
with the agent, i.e. the firm’s manager.
45 Even in systems where ownership is concentrated among
professional institutional investors, collective action problems
can arise if those institutions’ incentives become aligned with
those of managers. In this case, the agency problem is between
the individuals who invest in the collective investment scheme
(the principals) and the institutional investors (the agents) who
decide where to invest their money. More formally, delegated
asset management involves a layering of agency relationships.
For example, in a mutual fund there are two agency relationships:
the internal relationship between individual fund managers and
the fund management firm, and the external relationship,
involving the ultimate investor and the fund management firm.
46 Further country details are presented in Barca and Becht (2001).33
ECB





A particular feature of European financial
systems, certainly compared with the US, is the
prominent role of banks as providers of both
debt and equity finance to non-financial
companies. For example, some reports suggest
that German banks hold around 10% of the
country’s corporate equity, compared with US
banks that hold less than 2% of corporate
equities.47 In a number of European countries,
banks exert significant influence over firms’
behaviour, even without owning large equity
stakes, for two main reasons. First, banks may
often act as custodians for customers who own
equities, and are commonly given voting rights
for these shares.48 Second, banks in Europe
frequently exert control on firms through their
direct involvement in the management of the
firm.
Problems can nonetheless arise with the
stakeholder model if the insiders’ private
benefits of control outweigh the shared benefits
that accrue to minority shareholders. The shared
benefits of control arise from the better
monitoring (through information sharing and
the substantial collation of decision rights) and
wealth effects that come from large-block
ownership (Holderness, 2003). However,
blockholders also have the incentive to use their
voting power to their own advantage and to the
detriment of minority shareholders.49 These are
the private benefits of control, and can be either
pecuniary (for example exploiting synergies of
production) or non-pecuniary, such as the
amenities that may be associated with
controlling the firm. In similar fashion to the
shareholder model, market discipline can be
undermined by the existence of such private
benefits. That is, controlling shareholders
essentially become “insiders” and direct the
company to serve their own interests in the
same way as company managers might in the
shareholder model. This seems to have
happened in the Parmalat case, for example,
where the majority shareholders exercised
considerable power over the firm to the
detriment of the other owners and stakeholders.
No. of Largest voting 2nd largest voting 3rd largest voting
Country companies block: median block: median block: median
Austria 50 52 2.5 0 1)
Belgium 140 56 6.3 4.7
Germany 372 57 0 1) 0
Spain 193 34.5 8.9 1.8
France 40 20 5.9 3.4
Italy 214 54.5 5 2.7
Netherlands 137 43.5 7.7 0 1)
Sweden 304 34.9 8.7 4.8
UK 207 9.9 6.6 5.2
U S ----
NYSE 1,309 5.4 0 1) 0 1)
NASDAQ 2,831 8.6 0 1) 0 1)
Source: ECGN (European Corporate Governance Network) as detailed in Barca and Becht (2001).
Note: The table reports the size of the largest, 2nd largest and 3rd largest median voting blocks for non-financial companies listed on
an official market. For France, the main stock price index (CAC40) is covered.
1) No 5%+ voting block.
Table 7 Corporate ownership structure in different countries
47 Figures quoted from Schmidt-Bies (2003).
48 In Germany, the influence of proxy voting is increased by
restrictions in many German corporate charters that cap the
voting rights of shareholders, regardless of the amount of voting
shares they may own. Typical caps are 5% or 10% of total voting
shares. Although these restrictions limit the power of any large
blockholder, including banks, the restrictions rarely apply to the
proxy votes that banks may cast on behalf of dispersed
shareholders.
49 Private benefits may also be negative if, for example,
blockholders incur personal costs from monitoring the firm.34
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Furthermore, it is not always clear that
blockholders (especially institutional investors)
have greater incentives to monitor actively and
influence both management actions and
corporate governance mechanisms in the firms
in which they invest. On the one hand, because
blockholders have more bargaining power over
company management than individual
investors, they will derive more benefits from
mitigating corporate malfeasance. On the other
hand, index fund managers may have no interest
in shareholder activism, since they merely
adjust their holdings when the mix of the index
changes and only want to follow the index,
not influence it. Furthermore, institutional
shareholders may have conflicts of interest that
encourage a passive approach. Activism by a
mutual fund or pension fund manager could
strain its relationships with corporate clients.
For example, a fund manager bidding for the
management of a firm’s pension scheme may be
reluctant to vote against the board of directors’
proxy recommendations. These sorts of
arguments may go some way to explain why
over recent years, even though institutional
investors have enjoyed greater access to
information, more possibilities to analyse this
information accurately, and significant voting
power, they nevertheless failed to insist on
better financial accounting information and
governance practices.
Overall, it is difficult to assess a priori the
effect of ownership structures on financial
market dynamics. Prices and quantities could
become volatile if large blockholders pursue
policies that ultimately make firms more
vulnerable. However, such investors may
equally be more active shareholders, keeping in
close contact with firms’ management to
exercise control of their behaviour and
promoting good corporate governance. In doing
so, they may be able to prevent companies
taking on inappropriate amounts of risk.
2.4.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A number of studies have investigated whether
ownership concentration directly affects firms’
market values, but with generally mixed results.
A 1998 summary of the results of 20 empirical
studies of the effects of formal shareholder
proposals and private negotiations with firms’
management reported evidence of little or no
effect on shareholder value.50 However, a more
recent paper by Gompers and Metrick (2001)
found that stock returns over the period
1980-1996 were higher for companies with
greater institutional ownership, suggesting that
blockholders (or at least large institutions) may
indeed be playing a valuable monitoring role –
one that translates into higher stock prices.
In part the mixed empirical results may reflect
difficult conceptual issues. For example,
differences in a firm’s value may reflect the
effects of other systematic factors such as the
degree of competition faced by the firm rather
than its ownership structure. Likewise,
ownership concentration may arise as a result of
differences in firm valuation rather than the other
way round – investors may choose to accumulate
blocks of shares in high-value firms. However,
the inconclusive results also reflect a weakness
in the design of the research. Most studies have
looked at the relationship between ownership
concentration and the stock valued at the
exchange price. This ignores the private benefits
that might accrue to investors who take up a large
block shareholding in a firm. In doing so, the
studies have not adequately investigated how far
these private benefits can undermine market
discipline. For example, there is a suspicion that
mechanisms that reduce the contestability of
control (pyramid structures, cross-shareholding,
voting agreements, shares with multiple voting
rights, etc.) also undermine market discipline.
Such corporate structures can imply that often the
only effective option for minority shareholders is
to sell stock to signal their dissatisfaction, which
can lead to belated and sometimes extreme
financial reactions. The recent Parmalat case
has reinforced these suspicions – according to
a report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the
company’s new auditor, Parmalat’s thirty-three
distributors in Italy were controlled by a chain
50 See Karpoff (1998).35
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of nine holding companies. At the top of the
pyramid were two companies which were in turn
controlled by the majority shareholders.
Moreover, there are other specific examples
where ownership structure does seem to have
had an important influence on financial market
outcomes, at least temporarily. For example, the
changes in ownership in some European
telecommunications companies in the late
1990s, including the various privatisation
programmes, clearly had an effect on European
financial markets in general as investors
assessed how far these companies potentially
represented the start of a new paradigm in the
exercise of corporate control in Europe. That is,
the takeover represented a test case as to how
far the balance of power had shifted towards
shareholders and away from other stakeholders.
At the same time, the lack of any conclusive and
systematic empirical relationship between
ownership structure and market prices is
perhaps not surprising. A significant
proportion of firms in Europe are not quoted.
This is partly due to the fact that euro area
economies have a relatively large proportion of
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).51
Furthermore, it is typically the case for a
number of firms in continental Europe that,
beyond the initial public offering, little equity is
sold, so that the company’s stock may be
largely illiquid. Non-financial corporations
hold a much larger proportion of shares in the
euro area than in the United States, which partly
reflects the importance of corporate cross-
shareholdings in the euro area. The direct
impact on financial market dynamics may
therefore be limited.
However, the presence of a large-percentage
shareholder can have indirect affects through
the latter’s influence over major corporate
decisions, which in turn can affect the degree of
vulnerability to sudden movements in market
sentiment or external shocks. In particular, the
concentration of ownership may affect
executive compensation, the degree of leverage
assumed by the firm and the likelihood that the
firm could be acquired. Of course, the indirect
influence of stakeholders need not be
detrimental to the firm. Indeed, one possible
reason why fewer corporate scandals have so
far arisen in Europe could be related to the
significant role played by banks in the
governance of firms. Specifically, acting as
“delegated monitors” and armed with better
information about firms’ activities, banks may
have been able to prevent the worst examples of
corporate malpractice. In contrast, in the US
market-based financial system, the control of
firms’ management is exercised by shareholders
that rely very heavily on the delegated auditing
role of reputational intermediaries. That said,
the fact that the actions of many firms may not
be frequently scrutinised directly by financial
markets suggests that an alternative, less
sanguine assessment cannot be excluded – the
more bank-oriented European system may
suffer from the same kind of “diseases”, but
the symptoms are typically suppressed or are
revealed more slowly, because corporate
excesses are dealt with internally through bank-
client relationships or the actions/influence of
large blockholders.
51 66% of all employees in Europe are employed by SMEs,
compared with 46% in the United States. Partly as a consequence
of this, many euro area companies either resort to banks to
finance their activities, or use extensively unquoted shares. See
Hartmann, Maddaloni, Manganelli (2003).36
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In the wake of the recent corporate scandals and
evidence of market abuses (especially the role
of investment banks in deliberately trying to
inflate asset prices), a number of policy
initiatives have taken place. In the United
States, the authorities have responded with
increased formal regulation. Most of this is
enshrined in the Sarbanes-Oxley (S-O) Act and
the related subsequent changes to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
rules. One key change brought about by the S-O
Act is the requirement that firms’ CEOs and
CFOs must personally certify their financial
reports. Specifically, each CEO and CFO must
submit a written statement to accompany each
annual and quarterly report filed with the SEC.
These statements are subject to significant
criminal penalties for false certification. These
new rules come on top of Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Reg FD) in the US, implemented in
August 2000, which sought to reduce
information disparities between individual and
institutional market participants. For example,
Reg FD requires that any advance warning
about earnings telephoned to a security analyst
must also be immediately released to the public
through a press release, open conference call, or
other public communication.
More recently, the SEC has also initiated new
rules that require securities analysts to certify
that their research reports and public comments
reflect their personal views and that they have
not been paid by the covered issuers. And on
28 April 2003, a global settlement was
announced between the US SEC and ten leading
investment banks, involving the payment of
around 1.4 billion US dollars, and ending a
year-long investigation into the research advice
provided by these banks to their clients. Part of
the settlement implied that, in the future,
investment banks will be required to adopt new
operating procedures aimed at separating their
research functions from their underwriting
business. At the same time, privileged
placement of IPO shares to clients will
generally not be allowed.
In Europe, a number of regulatory changes were
already in the pipeline before the recent
corporate scandals as part of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) to develop and
strengthen the single European market. The
episodes of corporate malfeasance that have
recently come to light have given greater
impetus to this process and have indeed been
influential in framing changes to the proposed
regulations. The lack of transparency in
financial account reporting, and information
disclosure more generally, has been recognised
as a particular weakness in Europe, and a
number of EU directives are now coming
onstream. These include:
– a Regulation on the application of the
International Accounting Standards (IAS)
adopted in July 2002 and further
complemented in May 2003, which will
make the application of the IAS to the
drawing up of annual accounts mandatory
for all companies (including banks) whose
securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market and which prepare
consolidated accounts from 2005 onwards52;
– the Directive on Market Abuse (adopted in
January 2003), which, inter alia, requires
issuers to publish inside information. The
existing ad hoc disclosure requirements of
price-sensitive information are to be
replaced, thereby strengthening disclosure
requirements;
– the Directive on Prospectuses (adopted in
July 2003), which deals with initial
disclosure requirements by corporations at
the point of public offer of securities/ their
admission to trading on a regulated market.
3 OFFICIAL RESPONSES SO FAR
52 In September 2003 the Commission adopted a Regulation
endorsing the IAS, with the exception of IAS 32 and IAS 39,
pending the finalisation of these standards by the International
Accounting Standards Boards (IASB). See also Enria et al.
(2004). The adoption of the IAS was overall endorsed by EU
finance ministers at the ECOFIN meeting in July 2003. However,
there is still much debate, especially concerning the IAS for the
recognition and measurement of financial instruments (IAS 39),
which is currently under review by the IASB.37
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The Directive should provide for a European
passport for a prospectus;
– the future Directive on Transparency
(proposal approved by the European
Parliament (EP) in March 2004), which will
require share issuers to publish their annual
financial reports within three months and to
provide more detailed half-yearly financial
reports and less demanding quarterly
financial information for the first and third
quarter of a financial year. In addition, it will
introduce half-yearly financial reporting to
issuers of only debt securities which are
currently not subject to any interim reporting
requirements.
In addition, in May 2003 the EC communicated
an Action Plan for “Modernising Company Law
and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union” to the Council and the EP,
which was open for public consultation until
31 August 2003. The adoption of an Action
Plan on Company Law and Corporate
Governance had been requested by the Brussels
European Council of March 2003.53
There is no proposal to form an EU-wide
corporate governance code, and corporate
governance guidelines will therefore remain
predominantly on a national basis. Nonetheless,
the Action Plan advocates a common EU-level
approach with respect to a few essential rules,
and calls for adequate coordination of corporate
governance codes across countries. More
specifically, in the area of corporate
governance, the action plan suggests measures
to:
– enhance disclosure. In particular,
institutional investors should be obliged to
disclose their investment policy and their
policy with respect to the exercise of voting
rights in companies in which they invest;
– strengthen shareholders’ rights in listed
companies across the EU (e.g. the right to
ask questions, to table resolutions, to vote in
absentia, etc.). This should be achieved by
the provision of comprehensive information
and the development of facilities to ensure
that existing rights can be effectively
exercised;
– modernise company boards. Certain
minimum standards of independence for
board members should be established at the
EU level. In particular, minimum standards
should apply to the creation, composition
and role of the nomination, remuneration and
audit committees.
So far the EU authorities have not defined their
stance on how to operationalise the Action Plan,
but initiatives are expected in the second half of
2004. However, following the Parmalat affair,
the Commission decided to strengthen its earlier
proposals for auditing standards, and on
16 March 2004 the Commission outlined a new
Directive on Statutory Audit in the EU. The
Directive includes provisions for auditors’
responsibility for the full group of companies,
obligatory independent audit committees for
listed companies, external quality assurance of
auditing firms, and the adoption of international
auditing standards. The Directive also proposes
that an audit regulatory committee comprised of
Member State representatives be created so that
the Directive can be rapidly implemented in
detail or modified.
To the extent that these measures collectively
improve the quality and flow of information to
investors and, in particular, facilitate
comparability across firms in Europe, they are
likely to enhance the efficiency of financial
markets and strengthen market discipline. It is
therefore important that the momentum behind
53 The Action Plan on Company Law is a follow-up to the work of
the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (the so-called
Winter Group) which was published in November 2002 with a
view to introducing new regulation. The Winter Group report
considered corporate governance arrangements in Europe
generally, but some of the issues are the same as those addressed
in the S-O Act. In particular, recommendations were made to
establish collective responsibility of company directors for
misinformation.38
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the FSAP and Action Plan on Company Law
does not wane. The FSAP itself is due to be
implemented by 2005.
However, it should be remembered that greater
transparency in financial reporting will not of
itself prevent fraudulent accounting behaviour
of the sort highlighted in the Enron and
Parmalat cases. Moreover, increased
information need not necessarily imply less
volatility in financial markets. For example,
recent research by Bailey, Li, Mao and Zhong
(2003) has found that following the adoption in
the US of Regulation Fair Disclosure in August
2000, market behaviour around earnings
releases displayed no significant change in
return volatility. Greater information disclosure
does not necessarily imply greater
transparency. Instead, greater transparency
implies information that allows understanding
of a firm’s exposures and risks without
distortion. Consequently, effective market
discipline requires firms not only to provide
information but also to place that information in
a context that makes it meaningful, and in ways
that accurately reflect the risks it has taken on.
As far as addressing the issues relating to
conflicts of interest facing investment analysts,
to the extent that the various new rules that have
followed the S-O Act apply to foreign
participants in US capital markets, then
European issuers should already meet the US
provisions. In addition, the new Market Abuse
Directive and the revised Investment Services
Directive will go some way towards addressing
issues of market manipulation and insider
dealing as well as conflicts of interest between
investment firms and investors.
More generally, the uncertainty in financial
markets created by the recent wave of corporate
scandals may mean that similar initiatives are
voluntarily adopted by firms in Europe as a way
of reducing investor nervousness. The
provisions may as a result become industry
practice, especially by those institutions
wishing to attract foreign investors. Firms may
thus have an incentive to improve accounting
disclosure practices to reduce their financing
costs.
In addition to these market-led solutions, a
number of official bodies in Europe are currently
investigating or have responded with more
formal regulations. In particular, the UK’s
Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a
consultation document in February 2003 setting
out proposals to strengthen the regulatory regime
for investment banks that undertake investment
research and participate in new issues of
securities. The key principle adopted by the FSA
is that “regulated firms should have systems and
controls in place to ensure their own interests do
not improperly influence the content of research
reports.” The International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) also set up a
task force to examine conflict of interest issues
surrounding research dissemination by sell-side
analysts. Similarly, regulators in Germany,
France and Italy have all adopted new rules with
varying levels of severity. In Italy, the authorities
have introduced new measures that limit and
prevent opportunistic behaviour by analysts in
addition to the requirement that all research
reports be filed with the regulatory authority.
And German regulators now demand that any
involvement as a manager or co-manager of an
offering in the subject company in the previous
five years should be disclosed.
In January 2004 in France the Louis Vuitton
group (LVMH) successfully sued Morgan
Stanley for losses caused by “gross
misconduct” in relation to allegedly tainted
financial analysis favouring Morgan Stanley’s
client, and LVMH’s rival, Gucci. The French
court ordered the bank to pay 30 million euro
and held out the possibility of further
compensation; an independent expert will
estimate how much LVMH had to spend from
1999 to 2002 to compensate for the damage it
suffered. The judgement, which is subject to
appeal, is the first European court decision on
the liability of investment banks in relation to
financial analysis, and could pave the way for
similar actions in other jurisdictions.39
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At the EU level, the European Securities
Committee (ESC) established a Forum Group on
Financial Analysts54 to make recommendations
on the best regulatory and market practices for
financial analysts. This initiative was the
Commission’s response to the conclusions of the
informal ECOFIN meeting at Oviedo in April
2002. The final report of the group was
published in September 2003. An overarching
theme running throughout the report is the
promotion of a “principles-based regime,
emphasising transparency and self-governance,
rather than a rules-based regime”.
Overall, the measures adopted by regulators seek
to address situations that may give rise to
potential conflicts of interest. These situations are
not new. In the recent past, they have been
controlled largely by market participants’ self-
regulation. Recent events however have
undermined confidence in the effectiveness of
such a regulatory approach, and have prompted
calls from some quarters for a complete
separation of activities which, when combined,
can create perverse incentives. The SEC
regulations go further in this direction than the
new rules adopted in Europe, at least so far. It is
not clear whether the EU will need to move closer
to the US model. The Parmalat affair has reignited
debate in the EU about the possible need for
further regulation in this area and in corporate
governance more generally, and may have
hardened views about the limitations of self-
regulation. Furthermore, the LVMH case
confirms that court action may follow if financial
institutions fail to manage conflicts of interest
adequately.
In recent testimony to the European Parliament on
11 February 2004, Commissioner Bolkestein
suggested that it was critically important for the
financial industry to put its own house in order –
industry leaders should “stand up and take
charge: to clear out the crooks, expose their
unscrupulous practices and curb excessive
greed.” If this does not happen, tougher
regulations may have to be implemented. In
particular, he suggested that the role and
regulatory control of offshore centres needs to be
tightened. The proposal for a Third Money
Laundering Directive is expected to play a crucial
role in this context.
Efficient regulation requires regulatory
responses to be proportionate to the level of
market failure occurring. It also requires
transparency and accountability in regulatory
decision-making. A balance needs to be struck
between addressing identified market failures
and allowing market participants the freedom to
transact so that capital may flow to the most
productive opportunities. Moreover, regulators
and legislators need to be alert so as to avoid
inadvertently introducing additional problems
to the ones they are seeking to overcome.
One area where the official policy response has
so far been quite limited, both in Europe and the
US, is in relation to the role of rating agencies.
These intermediaries have become much more
influential in financial markets in recent years – a
successful issue of securities is pretty much
reliant on the securing of a favourable rating –
and yet the development of their role and
activities has brought forth a number of policy
issues.55 As previously argued, rating agencies’
analysts may face similar types of conflicts of
interest as their investment bank counterparts,
and these too could have been influential in
inflating asset prices in the late 1990s. It is not
clear how much these conflicts of interest were
genuinely influential: as with investment
bankers, it may be that analysts at rating agencies
were simply guilty of over-optimism.
Nonetheless, a number of observers have
seriously questioned the value of rating agencies
following their failure to provide advance
warning of impending problems at WorldCom,
Enron et al. They downgraded these companies
only after their financial insolvency was almost a
certainty. Furthermore, while analysts, auditors
54 The Forum Group was composed of practitioners, independent
consultants, regulators and professional bodies.
55 Among other things, the use of rating triggers by companies has
intensified the possible negative effects of rating downgrades on
companies’ solvency positions. Furthermore, the new Basel
Accord seems likely to propose external ratings as an indicator
of the solvency of banks’ credit clients. Both features underline
the increasing importance of ratings in financial systems.40
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and most financial institutions operate in highly
competitive markets, rating agencies seem to
enjoy oligopolistic power – the three major
US-based agencies dominate the global market.
Regulators in the US and Europe are currently
considering possible changes to the rules
relating to rating agencies. In particular, the
Commission is currently developing its stance
on this issue, taking into account a recent
European Parliament Resolution as well as any
possible regulatory action on the part of the
SEC.56 It is likely that concrete regulatory
proposals will be made public in autumn
2004.57
56 Consideration of the role of rating agencies was explicitly
excluded from the mandate of the Forum Group’s investigation
into financial analysts. Nonetheless, it was recognised that
analysts working for rating agencies may face similar types of
conflicts of interest as investment bank analysts, and may
potentially have an important influence on financial markets.
The Forum Group report recommended that further investigation
into the role of rating agencies be undertaken, although it also
suggested that analysts employed by credit rating agencies
should be subject to similar ethical principles as other financial
analysts.
57 On 10 February 2004, the European Parliament adopted the final
version of the EMAC report on credit rating agencies. The
European Parliament backed away from previous controversial
proposals that would have required rating agencies in Europe to
be regulated by a central authority, and which could have led to
the agencies being broken up into smaller specialist companies.
A softer compromise proposal, which called on the Commission
to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the effects on European
capital markets of creating such a regulatory authority, also
failed to win majority support. Instead, the European Parliament
called upon the Commission to monitor and assess the situation
and to report on any perceived need for regulation by July 2005.41
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Given the complex nature of financial markets,
it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
about the underlying forces driving market
outcomes, as any empirical analysis is unlikely
to be able to control for all the possible relevant
factors so as to isolate the influence of the issue
at hand. Nonetheless, the evidence presented
above would seem to indicate that two market
features, namely the potential for conflicts of
interest and the inadequacy of information
disclosure, may well have played a contributory
role in the recent swings in financial asset
prices.
In contrast, there is little evidence that
particular trading or investment strategies have
had a particularly influential, or at least long-
lasting, effect on financial market dynamics in
recent years. Similarly, there is little evidence
that firms’ ownership structure has had a
systematic effect on market outcomes, although
this topic is not covered particularly well in the
available empirical studies. Consequently, it
would be unwise to rule out important links
between ownership structure and market
dynamics, particularly when there have been
specific examples where it appears to have been
influential, at least temporarily.58 In the wake of
the Parmalat case, questions have been raised
about pyramid holdings and other such
corporate structures, which enable an entity
with a relatively small amount of capital in the
underlying major company to control it through
layers of other companies in the pyramid.
In the light of these overall conclusions, what
policy implications might ensue? Traditional
economic analysis suggests that intervention to
improve the functioning of markets should be
considered when there is evidence of market
failure and where such intervention can be
assessed to potentially improve the situation. In
the context of financial markets, such
intervention might be justified on three
grounds:
– potential for systemic risk; i.e. widespread
failure of financial institutions or disruption
of financial markets.
– investor protection; i.e. actions to prevent
uninformed agents unwittingly taking on
excessive risks.
– market integrity; i.e. the ability of certain
market participants to interfere with/
dominate/manipulate market outcomes.
Despite the widespread debate about the
failings of capital markets generated by the
recent wave of corporate failures, so far little
evidence suggests that the weaknesses
uncovered in market practices threaten the
stability of the financial system. Even in the
case of the two largest-ever corporate failures,
Parmalat and Enron, worries about the knock-
on implications for systemic stability have been
limited, not least because of the peculiar nature
of the problems faced by these firms.59
Furthermore, the spillovers to the financial
sector from corporate failures have so far been
quite modest, although admittedly the
ramifications of the recent stock market
instability may not yet have been fully
revealed.60 Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that such corporate failures have
demonstrated the self-correcting nature of the
market. Investors have sought to identify
fraudulent or failing companies more actively
and are now insisting upon higher standards of
corporate behaviour and auditing. Similarly, the
market is now more suspicious of earnings
management and other ways of manipulating
stock prices.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
58 The transparency of the structure of firm ownership and
organisation is also arguably important. Transparent structures
may help demonstrate to investors that conflicts of interest have
been appropriately addressed.
59 The limited impact on system-wide stability could also simply
reflect the resilience of the global financial system and the
efficiency in global risk-sharing. See for example Castren,
Miller and Stiegert (2003). In this context, the role played by
financial derivatives in spreading losses from corporate defaults
is particularly important.
60 For example, the bursting of the 1990s stock market bubble
reduced the net worth of a number of insurance companies and
pension funds across Europe. Even without significant
institutional insolvencies, the recent weakness in financial
markets is likely to have resulted in declines in individuals’ and
firms’ wealth (both directly and through their claims on
institutional investors). This may also have implications for
developments in the real economy if, as a result, consumption and
investment plans are amended.42
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However, to the extent that small investors are
unable to draw up contracts that provide an
incentive for intermediaries/advisers to act in
investors’ interests, policy intervention may be
required for their protection. This is especially
true given the trend in recent years, especially in
continental Europe, from public towards private
pension provision. Non-professional investors
may simply be unaware of the potential
conflicts of interest that might prejudice any
investment advice they receive. They might
perceive insurance products as being effectively
“riskless” financial assets, and treat them as a
close substitute for bank deposits. Similarly,
the lack of reliable and relevant information
about firms’ activities and exposures, and in
particular the recent cases of firms restating
their accounts, have led to calls for improved
disclosure standards for firms. In particular,
investment banks, rating agencies and auditors
ought to reveal their own interests in the firms
they are proposing to investors. Armed with
better information, investors should be better
able to evaluate the risks attached to their
investments. It is also argued that mandatory
disclosure might go some way towards
preventing firms hiding or embellishing
financial accounting information in an attempt
to deceive investors or manipulate financial
market responses.61 However, it should also be
noted that the provision of more information
is no panacea: financially unsophisticated
investors may still take on inappropriate levels
of risk. For these types of investor, greater
disclosure needs to be accompanied by better
investor education.62
To some extent, market-led solutions are likely
to emerge. Financial intermediaries rely to large
extent on their reputations; however, recent
events have shaken investor trust in a number of
established intermediaries, and they now have
an incentive to adopt practices to restore this
trust. For example, investment banks are now
likely to investigate ways to strengthen the
firewalls between departments, if only to
satisfy investors’ worries about conflicts of
interest, let alone to avoid legal reprisals.
Similarly, rating agencies have already
implemented a number of procedures designed
to assure the independence and objectivity
of the rating process – e.g. requiring rating
decisions to be made by rating committees,
imposing investment restrictions, and adhering
to fixed fee schedules.
Nonetheless, policy-makers have also
responded with more increased regulation. So
far at least, the new rules in Europe are less
severe than in the US. To some extent, this
reflects the fact that global market participants
may adopt US practices as the de facto industry
standard. It may also reflect the smaller role of
private (i.e. non-professional) investors in
Europe: the level of investments held directly
by individuals is much lower, and institutional
investors are more prevalent. However, EU
regulators need to monitor how far the new
rules are effective in changing behaviour
without unduly impeding market efficiency, or
whether stronger regulation is required. The
Parmalat case could prove a watershed in this
respect, demonstrating as it did that corporate
malfeasance is not solely a US problem.
Moreover, this affair has raised question marks
with regard to how far self-regulation is
effective in tackling the sorts of malpractice
revealed.
61 Survey evidence suggests that, post-Enron, the awareness of
potential deficiencies in disclosure by European corporates has
increased. In a survey undertaken by PeopleSoft/CFO Europe (an
Economist Group publication) in September 2002, more than 95%
of the 235 European executives surveyed felt that it was
important to provide more financial information to executive
management, non-executive directors and shareholders to
improve corporate accountability. As well as greater financial
disclosure, nearly all survey respondents believed that financial
accountability ought to be extended to line management to
support corporate reform. A further 84% cited the need for
faster management reporting as another key initiative that could
improve corporate accountability. Similarly, in another survey by
PR Newswire published in Autumn 2002, the majority of
European companies supported the idea of an enhanced pan-
European disclosure standard; only 12% of respondents
advocated no change to the current regulations.
62 Even then, a more general policy dilemma concerns how much
risk can be borne by individuals. Typically the asset allocation of
professionally-managed defined-benefit pension funds often has
a much lower equity content than that of funds where individuals
choose how much to invest and in what. This means that
individual investors may be vulnerable to increased volatility in
equity markets, even though they are not particularly well-
equipped to deal with such financial market volatility.43
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One area where the official response has so far
been quite limited is in relation to rating
agencies, whose role in financial markets has
become increasingly more influential. A number
of official reviews are currently underway, with
a view to introducing policies that will foster
greater competition in the market and promote
improvements in market practices. However,
the issue is not straightforward. If policy
actions encourage rating agencies to change
their ratings to reflect the latest developments in
a firm’s financial health, this itself could
present potential problems. In particular, the
purpose of ratings is often to provide a long-
term view on the ability of the company to repay
the investor. If ratings become more responsive
to short-term news about firms, this in itself
might impart greater volatility to financial
markets. For example, such “point-in-time”
ratings may encourage greater pro-cyclicality,
so that firms could find it even harder to obtain
market financing during cyclical downturns.63
To sum up, under any system of control other
than owner management, there are a number of
potentially intractable agency relationships –
between the notional controllers of the company
and senior management, between investors and
their advisers, etc. The unique knowledge
possessed by management leads to asymmetric
information. Those who bear the risk must rely
on somebody else to act on their behalf, perhaps
relying on advice from others. This creates the
principal-agent dilemma. In addressing this
issue, regulators need to strike a balance
between allowing market participants the
freedom to transact, so that capital may flow to
the most productive opportunities, while at the
same time preventing serious market abuses.
The corporate failures of recent years provide a
stark demonstration of how incentive structures
can become destabilising and of the weaknesses
of self-regulation. The regulatory response has
been quite swift and visible in parts of Europe,
and particularly in the US. The new rules, as
well as those in the pipeline, will hopefully curb
most examples of profligate behaviour.
However, equally significant could be the
response of investors themselves, who may
seek more reassurance that their interests are
being well served by firms’ managers and
advisers. Furthermore, it is important that
regulators do not overreact to recent
developments and thereby risk generating
additional problems through their actions, albeit
different ones, to the ones that they originally
sought to address.
63 Similar arguments have been raised in the context of the new
Basel II capital regulations.44
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